Trends and issues in tax policy and reform in India. by M. Govinda Rao & Rao, R. Kavita
2
Trends and Issues in Tax Policy
and Reform in India
M. Govinda Rao 
and 
R. Kavita Rao3
Trends and Issues in Tax Policy







World over, tax systems have undergone significant changes
during the last 20 years as many countries across different ideological
spectrum and varying levels of development have undertaken reforms.
The wave of tax reforms across the world that began in the mid 1980s
actually accelerated in the 1990s motivated by a number of factors.   In
many developing countries, pressing fiscal imbalance was the driving
force.  Tax policy was employed as a principal instrument to correct
severe budgetary pressures (Ahmad and Stern, 1991).  In others, the
transition from plan to market necessitated wide ranging tax reforms.
Besides efficiency considerations, these tax reforms had to address the
issue of replacing public enterprise profits with taxes as a principal
source of revenue and aligning tax policy to change the development
strategy.  Another motivation was provided by the internationalisation of
economic activities arising from increasing globalisation.  While the
hand, this has entailed  significant  reduction  in  tariffs  and  replacement 
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had to be found for this important and relatively easily administered
revenue source, on the other, globalisation emphasised the need to
minimise both efficiency and compliance costs of the tax system.  The
supply side tax reforms of the Thatcher-Reagan era also had their impact
on the tax reforms in developing countries.
The evolution of Indian tax system was motivated by similar
concerns and yet, in some ways, it is different and even unique.   Unlike
most developing countries, which were guided in their tax reforms by
multilateral agencies, Indian tax reform attempts have largely borne a
domestic brand.  They have been calibrated in response to changes in
the development strategy over time while keeping in tune with the
institutional arrangements in the country.
1  Thus, even when the
government sought assistance from multilateral financial institutions, the
recommendations of these institutions did not directly translate into an
agenda for tax reform.   Despite this, the tax system reforms were
broadly in conformity with international trends and advice proffered by
expert groups and was in tune with international best practices.
2 
Inevitably, tax policy has evolved in the country in response to
changing development strategy over the years.  In the initial years, the
tax policy was guided by a large number of demands placed on the
government (Bagchi and Nayak, 1994). They can be summarised into
the need to increase the level of savings and investment in the economy
and hence stimulate growth and the need to ensure a fair distribution of
incomes. These meant an effort to raise taxes from those with an “ability
to pay”, with little regard for the efficiency implications of the chosen
instruments for the purpose.   
The role of history and institutions was also important in shaping
the tax system in the country.  Indeed, the nature of federal polity,
assignment of tax powers and tax sharing arrangements have impacted
on the incentives for revenue mobilisation and the structure and
administration of the taxes in both central and state governments.  The
overlapping tax systems have made it difficult to have encompassing,
comprehensive and co-ordinated tax system reforms.  Another legacy of
planning is selectivity and discretion both in designing the structure and
in implementation of the tax system. These contributed to erosion of the
tax base, created powerful special interest groups, and introduced5
‘negotiated settlement’ to the tax system.
3  In a closed economy,
inefficiencies did not matter and relative price distortions and
disincentives to work, save and invest did not warrant much
consideration.
The Indian tax reform experience can provide useful lessons for
many countries due to the largeness of the country with multilevel fiscal
framework, uniqueness of the reform experience and difficulties in
calibrating reforms due to institutional constraints.  These, by
themselves, are important enough reasons for a detailed analysis of the
tax system in India.  Unfortunately, unlike in many developed countries
where major tax reform initiatives were followed by detailed analysis of
their impact, there are no serious studies analysing the economic impact
of tax reforms in India.
4   
This paper undertakes the analysis of the Indian tax system.  It
details the evolution of the tax system and its reform over the years and
analyses its efficiency and equity implications. In section 2, alternative
models of tax system reform are presented with a view to identifying the
best practice approach followed in tax system reforms.  Surely, in a
democratic polity, it is difficult to achieve the ideal and yet, the framework
helps to keep the focus on further reforms.   Section 3 analyses the
evolution of Indian tax system and the impact of historical and
institutional factors in shaping Indian tax policy.  The trends in tax
revenue are presented in section 4 and these point towards a relative
stagnation and deceleration in tax revenues at both central and state
levels.  Section 5 analyses the reasons for the stagnation in revenues at
central and state levels.  This is followed by an exploratory discussion on
the possible efficiency and equity implications of tax system.  The final
section presents directions for further reforms.
2. Changing Paradigms of Tax Policy and Reform
In the literature on tax design and reform, the thinking on what
constitutes the best tax system and an implementation strategy to
achieve it have undergone considerable change over the years mainly
due to the changing role of the state in development and
internationalisation of economic activities (Bird and Oldman, 1990; Gillis,6
1989; Boskin and McLure, 1990). Design of tax policy and reform of an
existing tax regime can be two distinctly different exercises, not always
generating the same set of results. It is possible to argue that the
objective of tax reform should be to chart the course for taking a given
tax regime to one “optimally” designed. However, history of the existing
system, as well as political and administrative constraints could place
limits on such a transition path. For instance, a comprehensive
consumption tax of the VAT variety might be best implemented at the
national level, so as to avoid issues relating to treatment of inter-state
taxation. But the assignment of tax powers in India could make that
transition difficult, if not impossible. Reform, therefore, might have to
explore other alternatives such as dual VAT. 
One important school of thought, which focuses on the design of
a tax system, is  optimal taxation. This school of thought recognises the
difficulties of achieving the first best and emphasises the need to
minimise the deadweight losses in exploring the second best solutions.
Here one can distinguish two key approaches. First, based on the
assumption that government is all-powerful, fully informed, benevolent
and driven by efficiency consideration, derives the following result: to
minimise the excess burden of raising given amount of revenue,
consumption should be taxed and the optimal rate of tax on individual
commodities should be related to the direct and cross-price elasticities of
demand. In the special case when the compensated cross price
elasticities are zero, the optimal tax rate is inversely proportional to the
direct compensated price elasticity of demand (Ramsey Rule). The lower
the compensated price elasticity of demand, the smaller the movement
away from the undistorted first-best optimum in response to the tax so
that it pays to tax the lower-elasticity goods at higher rates. Since tax
structures designed on these principles would involve taxing necessities,
the need to address distributional concerns becomes paramount (Stern,
1987).  Incorporating distributional considerations into this paradigm
brought in discussions of optimal income tax, applications of which
interestingly do not support sharply progressive tax structures. 
The second approach recognises that the government typically
lacks the information on elasticities and is subject to lobbying when it is
willing to tax different goods at different rates.  Associated with the
names of Harberger (1990) and Hatta(1986), this approach leans more
heavily towards taxing consumption at uniform rates across goods.
According to this school, while efficiency (and distribution weights) is7
clearly desirable in the design of tax policy, administrative capacity,
attention to local institutions and political realities are equally, if not more,
important.  The principal concern is not to design a system that will be
‘optimal’, but adopt the system that will minimise tax-induced distortions
and at the same time, is administratively feasible and politically
acceptable. The basic Harberger reform package for developing
countries that are price takers in the international market consists of,
inter alia, uniform tariff and a broad-based Value Added Tax (VAT).
Panagariya and Rodrik (1992) examine the rationale for uniformity in the
context of import tariffs and argue that while the case for uniform tariffs is
not watertight, uniformity minimises the pressures for favourable (lower)
rates on some goods over others.  The commitment to a uniform tax rate
introduces a free-rider problem for industries to lobby for lower rates for
themselves (since such lower rates are then extended to everyone). 
 While the literature has focused more on the former, it has
played limited role in actual tax-policy formulation. The second approach,
combined with administrative cost considerations emerges to be a closer
approximation of the approach of tax-policy practitioners. The thrust of
most tax-policy advice within this approach is to enhance revenue
productivity of the tax system while minimising relative price distortions.
This involves efforts to broaden the tax base, lower the rates and reduce
rate differentiation of both direct and indirect taxes. Adoption of uniform
tax rate has been an important feature of practical approaches to tax
reform (Rao, 1992). A broader base requires lower rates to be levied to
generate a given amount of revenue. It also helps to ensure horizontal
equity, is desirable from the political economy point of view as
elimination of exemptions and concessions reduces the influence of
special interest groups on tax policy and reduces administrative costs.
Lower marginal rates not only reduce disincentives to work, save and
invest, but also help to improve tax compliance. The preference for broad
based and uniform rates of taxation, thus, is guided by the need to
eliminate an arbitrary array of tax differentials determined more by
special interest group politics than pursuit of economic efficiency.
Further, the limited infrastructure and capacity of tax administrations in
developing countries constrain them from effectively administering
complicated tax regimes. Broad-based systems of taxation based on
uniform rates are a mechanism for providing stability and simplicity to the
tax system. 8
The introduction of VAT is an important component of recent tax
reform packages in most of the countries, especially in the context of
declining emphasis on import tariffs. Keen and Ligthart (2002) show that
in small open economies any revenue neutral tariff cut accompanied by
price neutral destination based VAT will enhance both net revenue and
welfare.  While, this result is contested, especially in the context of
developing economies with significant informal sectors, the debate does
not extend to cases where VAT seeks to replace a cascading type of
sales tax or broad-based excise duty. Further, in large economies,
complete replacement of revenue from international trade taxes by VAT
may not be possible since it might be associated with unacceptably high
tax rates and even if it were, the revenue may not accrue to the central
government in a federal set up like India where the states have
traditionally held the power to levy sales tax Rajaraman (2004), implying
thereby the need to explore all other alternatives. 
In many countries, reason for levying the VAT has as much, if
not more, to do with replacing the cascading type sales taxes, which are
often, confined to the manufacturing stage than to substitute import
duties as a source of revenue.  In many cases the expansion of tax base
accompanying the VAT both due to extending of the tax to stages
subsequent to manufacturing, as also the self-enforcing nature of the tax
have led to higher revenue productivity.  Often, this has strengthened the
information base for tax administration resulting in improved compliance
in other taxes and thereby enhancing overall productivity of the tax
system.
5  Thus, as argued by Bird (2005), although VAT is not
necessarily a “money machine”, if the tax is administered properly, the
conventional conclusion that this is the best way to make up for the
revenue loss from trade liberalisation holds.
Some recent theoretical explorations have argued that the VAT
being a tax on the formal sector of the economy, and combined with
weak administration, help the spread of informal economy which is not
conducive for development (Emran and Stiglitz, 2004a, 2004b; Hines,
2004; Gordon and Wei, 2005).  This issue, however, is also applicable to
many other taxes levied in developing countries.  In fact, most taxes in
developing countries are levied on the formal sector. In the context of
tariffs, it has been shown that smuggling – the informal sector
counterpart in the case of imports – will lower both revenue and welfare
(Bhagwati and Hansen, 1973; Martin and Panagariya, 1984). Besides, by
being in the non-formal sector, the economic agent will have to contend9
with high transaction costs. The extent to which VAT encourages non-
formal sector will also vary from country to country.  Besides, the formal
sector has dynamism of its own as it opens up avenues to expand
businesses.
6  
Another critique of the appropriateness of the VAT in developing
countries is based on the market structures. Das-Gupta (2004) argues
that, under imperfect competition, since neither the gains from input-tax
credit nor the entire tax burden need be passed on to the consumer, a
turnover tax may be both revenue superior and welfare superior to a
VAT. This result, however, is based on a static framework. In a dynamic
context, the taxpayers in this system can vertically integrate thereby
avoiding taxes and potentially undermining production efficiency. Further,
such a tax regime would perpetuate tax spillovers both across
jurisdictions within the country and across international borders. The
former would violate the common market principles, while the latter
would undermine the competitiveness of the domestic industry. 
Thus, as stated by Bird (2005), “One may criticise VAT in both
theory and practice, and much more such analysis and criticism is not
only to be expected but also welcomed.  In the end, VAT almost certainly
works better both in theory and practice in most countries than any
feasible alternative”.  Again, as Bird states, “…the most basic lesson
….from experience to date with implementing VAT in developing and
transitional economies (DTE) is … that doing it right is in most respects a
matter more of art than of science.  ….the behaviour of the informal
sector depends, as some recent literature (Gerxhani, 2004) suggests,
largely on the interaction between formal institutions such as the tax
administration and the prevalent norms and customs in a country….”
Apart from concerns of efficiency, tax policy has often been
guided by the need to pursue the objective of redistribution. Most policy
analysts in the 1950s and 1960s assigned redistribution a central focus
in tax policies and considered that an ideal tax system should have a
highly progressive personal income tax combined with a high corporate
income tax. In fact, in the 1950s and the 1960s, the marginal rates of
personal income taxes were set at confiscatory levels.  This was not
merely an obsession in countries with interventionist strategies such as
India but was fashionable even in countries such as the U.S.A. and U.K.
In these countries, marginal income tax rates were set at over 90 percent10
immediately after the Second World War (Harberger, 2003).  In U. S. A.,
the tax rate of over 90 percent existed even until 1963. 
There were three important factors that have led to moderation in
the pursuit of redistribution through tax policy. First, experiences have
shown that highly progressive tax systems have done little to reduce
inequality in developing countries as they are neither progressive nor
comprehensive.
7   The empirical studies in U. S. A (Pechman, 1985) and
Chile (Engel Eduardo et. al., 1999) have shown that the extent of income
redistribution and reduction in inequality achieved by the tax systems
were insignificant.  Second, a redistributive tax system can impose
additional cost on the economy, which includes administrative costs,
compliance costs, economic efficiency costs and political costs. Third,
the focus of equity in fiscal policy itself has shifted from ‘reducing the
incomes of the rich’ to ‘increasing the incomes of the poor’ and in this,
the alternative approach of using expenditure programmes for poverty
alleviation have attracted greater attention.  (Harberger, 2003; Bird and
Zolt, 2005).
In practice the design of a tax system for developed countries
today would rely largely on consumption taxes (VAT) on all goods and
services applied at a more or less uniform rate. However, in the
presence of large informal sector and constraints in implementing
effective expenditure based redistribution measures, it may be necessary
to have a combination of income and consumption taxes, the latter
covering all goods and services, at fairly uniform rates. But such an
option may not be easily available, with a tax system already in place.
The task, therefore, is to reform the existing tax system so as to minimise
the excess burden of taxation within the broad contours of the existing
system. This involves reforms of all major taxes at the centre, state and
local levels. The direction of reform as guided by the literature on tax
reforms in developing countries include:
•  scaling down of and possible elimination of trade taxes over time;
•  reform of existing domestic indirect taxes to transform them into
comprehensive consumption taxes on goods and services: this
should cover both national and sub-national taxes;
•  a moderately progressive personal income tax; and
•  corporate income tax at a rate equivalent to the highest marginal rate
of personal income tax. 11
Probably, the most important aspect of the advice given to
developing countries in designing their tax systems is that the
administrative dimension should be kept at the centre rather than
periphery of reform efforts.  The poor administrative capacity creates a
wedge between the structure of the tax on paper and what actually works
in practice.  Apart from eroding revenue productivity, this results in the
perpetuation and even spread of non-formal economy, significant dead-
weight losses, and violation of horizontal equity. 
Tax policy, or for that matter any policy stands on the tripod of
‘architecture’, ‘engineering’ and ‘management’ (Bird and Zolt, 2005).
‘Architecture’ provides the design of the tax system to be achieved and
this is guided by the objectives of tax policy.  ‘Engineering’ provides the
mechanics to achieve it and these are provided by the nature of
institutions and systems involved in tax collection.  ‘Management’
provides implementation strategy and action and this inter alia, depends
on the political support and vision, nature of administration and
information system.  All the three legs of the tripod are interdependent.
A tax policy is only as good as it is administered and therefore, it is
important to design the tax system keeping the administrative capacity in
mind.  Similarly, the nature of tax institutions and systems will have to be
adapted keeping in view the design of the tax system and
implementation capacity.  Further, administrative capacity should be
continuously augmented to keep pace with changing requirements of tax
policy. In other words, reform of the tax system involving both its
structure and operations is a continuous process and has to be
calibrated constantly. A complementary action in this regard is the
building of proper information system. 
3.  Evolution of Indian Tax System
The basic framework for the tax system in independent India was
provided in the constitutional assignment of tax powers.  The important
feature of the tax assignment is the adoption of principle of separation in
tax powers between the central and state governments.  It assigned the
major broad based and mobile tax bases to the centre and these
included taxes on non-agricultural incomes and wealth, corporation
income tax, customs duties, and excise duties on manufactured12
products.  Over the years, the last item has evolved into a
manufacturers’ VAT on goods.  The major tax powers assigned to the
states include taxes on agricultural incomes and wealth, sales taxes,
excises on alcoholic products, taxes on motor vehicles, passengers and
goods, stamp duties and registration fees on transfer of property, and
taxes and duties on electricity.  They also have powers to levy taxes on
entertainment, taxes on professions, trade, callings and employment and
these have been exercised by the states themselves in some states and
in others they have been assigned to local bodies.  Although the state list
also includes tax on property and tax on the entry of goods into a local
area for consumption, use or sale, these have been assigned to local
bodies. The central government levied tax on selected services on the
basis of the residuary entry in the Union list from 1994, but in 2003,
power to tax services was specifically assigned to it.
8
Tax policy in India has evolved as an important component of
fiscal policy which had to play a central role in the planned development
strategy.  In particular, tax policy was the principal instrument to transfer
private savings for public consumption and investment (Bagchi and
Stern, 1994).  It was also employed to achieve a number of other
objectives including encouraging savings and investment, bringing about
reduction in inequalities of income and wealth, fostering balanced
regional development, encouraging small scale industries on the
assumption that they are employment intensive and influencing the
volume and direction of economic activities in the country.
The evolution of tax policy within the framework of public sector
based, heavy industry dominated, import substituting industrialisation
strategy has had several implications.  First, tax policy was directed to
raise resources for large and increasing requirements of public
consumption and investment irrespective of the efficiency implications it
entailed.  Second, the objective of achieving socialistic pattern of society
on the one hand and the large oligopolistic rents generated by the
system of licences, quotas and restrictions on the other, necessitated
steeply progressive tax structure in both direct and indirect taxes.  Third,
pursuit of multiplicity of objectives enormously complicated the tax
system with adverse consequences on efficiency and horizontal equity.
This also opened up large avenues for evasion and avoidance of taxes.
The disregard for efficiency considerations was a part of import
substituting industrialisation strategy. Fourth, all of the above required
not only differentiation in tax rates based on arbitrary criteria but also13
legitimised selectivity and discretion in tax policy and administration.
This gained legitimacy from the plan priorities.  Once selectivity and
discretion were accepted as legitimate, it mattered little whether these
were exercised as intended.  This provided enough scope for the special
interest groups to influence tax policy and administration.  Fifth, the
influence of special interest groups, changing priorities and lack of
information system and scientific analysis led to ad hoc and often,
inconsistent calibration of policies.  Finally, poor information system was
both the cause of selective application of the tax system as well as its
effect.   
This section summarises the evolution of the major central taxes
and provides an overview of the state taxes, i.e., personal income and
corporate tax among direct taxes and excise duty, customs duty and
service tax among the indirect taxes for the central government. At the
state level, the major initiative in recent times is the introduction of VAT,
and the discussion limits itself to this measure.
3.1  Reform of Central Taxes
The systematic attempt to evolve a tax system in independent
India started with the implementation of the report of the Taxation
Enquiry Commission (India, 1953).  In fact, this is the first comprehensive
attempt to review the tax system.  It was required to fulfil a variety of
objectives such as raising the level of savings and investment, effecting
resource transfer from private to public sector and achieving a desired
state of redistribution.  It was a comprehensive attempt to design the tax
system for the country and covered central, state as well as local taxes.
Although the report of the Commission was available in 1953-54, given
the ideological orientation of the Second Five Year Plan (1956-60),
Nicholas Kaldor was invited from Cambridge to produce a report on
Indian Tax Reform.  This report was used (rather incompletely) to raise
resources for the Second Five Year Plan. The implementation of the
expenditure tax on the recommendation of Kaldor (India, 1956) was
intended to curb consumption and raise the level of saving which was
abysmally low at about 10 percent of GDP.  However, this had to be
withdrawn in 1957-58 as it did not generate the expected revenues. 
With the adoption of planned development strategy in a mixed
economy framework, raising more resources and achieving the desired
state of redistribution became an obsession and this caused the14
policymakers to design the income tax system with confiscatory marginal
rates.  The consequent disincentives and high rate of return on tax
evasion, low probability of detection and the ineffective legal system
which failed to impose penalty within a reasonable time period, led the
Direct Taxes Enquiry Committee (India, 1971) to recommend significant
reduction in marginal tax rates.  On  the  indirect  taxes  side,  a  major
simplification exercise was attempted by the Indirect Taxes Enquiry
Committee (India, 1977). Implementation of the important
recommendations, however, was not initiated until 1986.  
Systematic and comprehensive attempts to reform the tax
system at the central level started only after market based economic
reforms were initiated in 1991.   The Tax Reforms Committee (India,
1991) laid out a framework and a roadmap for reform of the tax system,
both direct and indirect. The analytical basis for the reform in the new
millennium was provided by task force reports on the reform of direct and
indirect taxes (India, 2002) and the report of the task force on the
implementation of the Fiscal Responsibility of Budget Management Act,
2003 (India, 2004b).  In many ways the reforms since 1991, with
emphasis on simplicity and efficiency make marked departure from the
past.  In fact, the task force reports which build on the recommendations
of the TRC, are summarised below.  
Recommendations of the Tax Reform Committee (TRC)
Tax reform since 1991 was initiated as a part of the structural
reform process, following the economic crisis of 1991.  In keeping with
the best practices approach, the TRC adopted an approach of combining
economic principles with conventional wisdom in recommending
comprehensive tax system reforms.  There are three parts in the report.
In the first interim report, the committee set out the guiding principles of
tax reform and applied them to important taxes namely, taxes on income
and wealth, tariffs and taxes on domestic consumption.  The first part of
the final report was concerned mainly with the much-neglected aspect of
reforms in administration and enforcement of both direct and indirect
taxes.  The second part of the report dealt with restructuring the tariff
structure.  In keeping with the structural adjustment of the economy, the
basic principles taken in the recommendations were to broaden the
base, lower marginal tax rates, reduce rate differentiation, simplify the
tax structure and undertake measures to make the administration and
enforcement of the tax more effective.  The reforms were to be calibrated15
to bring about revenue neutrality in the short term and to enhance
revenue productivity of the tax system in the medium and long term.  The
overall thrust of the TRC was to (i) decrease the share of trade taxes in
total tax revenue; (ii) increase the share of domestic consumption taxes
by transforming the domestic excises into VAT; and (iii) increase the
relative contribution of direct taxes.
 
The important proposals put forward by the TRC included
reduction in the rates of all major taxes, i.e., customs, individual and
corporate income taxes and excises to reasonable levels, maintain
progressivity but not such as to induce evasion.  The TRC recommended
a number of measures to broaden the base of all the taxes by minimising
exemptions and concessions, drastic simplification of laws and
procedures, building a proper information system and computerisation of
tax returns, and a thorough revamping and modernisation of
administrative and enforcement machinery. It also recommended that the
taxes on domestic production should be fully converted into a value
added tax, and it should be extended to the wholesale level in agreement
with the states, with additional revenues beyond post-manufacturing
stage passed on to the state governments.
In the case of customs, the TRC recommended the tariff rates of
5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30 and 50 to be achieved by 1997-98. This meant a
considerable rationalisation from the prevailing structure with more than
100 rates ranging upto 400 percent. The tariff rate was to vary directly
with the stage of processing of commodities, and among final consumer
goods, with income elasticity of demand (higher rates on luxuries).  At
hindsight, it is easy to criticise the excessive rate differentiation (seven
rates) and according some degree of protection depending on the stage
of processing.  Thus, Joshi and Little (1996, p. 74) state, “….this is a
totally unprincipled principle, for it has no foundation in economic
principles” as in addition to continued complexity, the proposed tariff
structure creates very high differences in effective rates and provides
higher degree of protection to inessential commodities. 
The TRC recommendation also falls much short of developing a
co-ordinated domestic trade tax system in the country.  This, in a sense,
is understandable, as it had no mandate to go into the state level taxes.
However, the committee was aware of the serious problems of
avoidance and evasion in respect of sales taxes levied by the states
predominantly at the manufacturing stage.  Therefore, it did recommend16
the extension of the central VAT to the wholesale stage with the
revenues from the extended levy assigned to the States.
By all accounts, there has been considerable simplification and
rationalisation of the tax system at the central level in 2005 although
these reforms are neither uniform nor consistent and is the system far
from being perfect (Acharya, 2005).  There are still areas requiring
reforms and these will be discussed later. While the above description
gives a broad account of the history of tax reform, it is important to
understand the evolution of the tax structure in respect of each of the
major taxes.  The following provides the evolution of each of the major
central taxes namely, personal income tax, corporation income tax, union
excise duties and customs.  
3.2  Reform of Direct Taxes
At the central level, the changes in the income tax structure until
the mid 1970s were largely ad hoc dictated by the exigencies.  The tax
policy was central to the task of bringing about a socialistic pattern of
society, and in 1973-74, the personal income tax had eleven tax slabs
with rates monotonically rising from 10 percent to 85 percent.  When the
surcharge of 15 percent was taken into account, the highest marginal
rate for persons above Rs. 0.2 million income was 97.5 percent.
9  In fact,
increase in income tax rates to confiscatory levels was completed
immediately after the split in the Congress party in 1969 and this seems
to be a part of projecting the pro-left image of the party.
10 
The policy was similar in the case of company taxation.  The
classical system of taxation involved taxation of the profits in the hands
of the company and dividends in the hands of the shareholders.  A
distinction was made for widely held companies and different types of
closely held companies and the tax rate varied from the base rate of 45
percent to 65 percent in the case of some widely held companies.
Although nominal rates were high, the effective rates were substantial
lower owing to generous provision for depreciation allowance and
investment allowance.   In fact, some companies were able to make use
of generous tax preferences such that they did not pay any corporate tax
year after year.  
The  Direct Taxes Enquiry Committee (India, 1971) succinctly
brought out the impact of the confiscatory tax system.  It attributed the17
large scale tax evasion to confiscatory tax rates and recommended the
reduction in marginal rates to 70 percent. This was implemented only in
1974-75, when the tax was brought down to 77 percent including a 10
percent surcharge. However, simultaneously the wealth tax rates were
increased.  The marginal rate was further brought down to 66 percent
and the wealth tax rate was reduced from 5 percent to 2.5 percent in
1976-77.   In 1979-80, the surcharge on income tax was increased as
also wealth tax rates reached the maximum of 5 percent.  The major
simplification and rationalisation initiative, however, was in 1985-86 when
the number of tax slabs  were reduced from eight to four and the highest
marginal tax rate was brought down to 50 percent and wealth tax rates to
2.5 percent.  
The last wave of reforms in personal income taxation was
initiated on the basis of the recommendations of the TRC (India, 1991).
Tax rates were considerably simplified to have three slabs beginning with
a rate of 20 percent, a middle rate of 30 percent and the maximum rate
of 40 percent in 1992-93.  The financial assets were excluded from
wealth tax and the maximum marginal rate was reduced to one percent.
Further reduction came in 1997-98 when, the three rates were brought
down further to 10-20-30 percent respectively.  In subsequent years,
exigencies of revenue have led to adding surcharge and a two percent
primary education cess on all taxes for primary education.  
In the case of corporate taxation too, the basic rate was brought
down to 50 percent, and rates applicable to different categories of closely
held companies were unified at 55 percent.  Following the
recommendations of TRC, the distinction between closely held and
widely held companies was done away with and the tax rates were
unified at 40 percent in 1993-94.  In 1997-98, when personal income tax
rate was reduced, the company rate was brought down to 35 percent
and the levy of 10 percent dividend tax was shifted from individuals to
companies.  The subsequent years have seen lack of direction in the
measures adopted.  The dividends tax rate was increased to 20 percent
in  2000-01, reduced again to 10 percent in 2001-02 alongwith reversal
to the classical system of taxing it in the hands of shareholders and the
policy was reversed once again in 2003-04 with the levy of the tax on the
company.   
A major problem that has haunted the tax system and reduced
the tax base is the generous tax preferences.  In the case of personal18
income tax, the Advisory Group on Tax Policy and Tax Administration
lists the incentives in 25 pages of its report (India, 2001, pp. 125-150)
and the Task Force on Tax Policy and Tax Administration (India, 2002)
makes a detailed list of these concessions.  These include incentives
and concessions for savings, housing, retirement benefits, investment in
and returns from certain type of financial assets, investments in
retirement schemes and income of charitable trusts. These tax
preferences have not only distorted the after-tax rates of return on
various types of investments in unintended ways but also significantly
eroded the tax base.  
The major tax preferences in the case of corporate tax were
investment allowance and depreciation allowance.  In addition, tax
incentives were also provided for locating in backward areas.  The result
of these preferences were that there evolved a set of companies which
planned their activities to take full advantage of the generous
concessions to fully avoid the tax.  This form of tax avoidance by ‘zero-
tax’ companies was minimised by introducing the `Minimum Alternative
Tax’ in 1996-97.  Even as companies can take advantage of the tax
preferences, they are required to pay a tax on 30 percent of their book
profits. In subsequent years, a provision has been incorporated to allow
these companies paying a MAT to take partial credit of MAT against
income tax liabilities in following years.  Since MAT meant that a lot of
the other preferences accorded in the tax statute like accelerated
depreciation were not available to the unit, the partial credit mechanism
seeks to dilute the incidence of MAT on units which are only temporarily
coming into the purview of MAT.
A noticeable trend is that while until the mid 1990s tax reforms
were calibrated on the basis of a consistent theoretical framework, some
of the subsequent changes were ad hoc.  The prime example of this is
that of introduction of the MAT instead of phasing out tax preferences.
Fixing the rate of profits tax higher than the highest marginal rate of
personal income tax is another example.  Similarly, with a view to
improve tax compliance and create an audit trail, the securities
transactions tax was introduced in April, 2004 and cash withdrawal tax at
0.1 percent on all cash withdrawals above Rs. 25,000 from current
accounts of commercial banks was introduced in April, 2005.  The
measures however, are retrograde.  The former hinders the development
of stock market and discriminates against investments in shares.  The
latter will put enormous inconvenience to small and medium sized firms,19
which have to withdraw large amounts of cash even to pay the salaries
of their employees.
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The rates of personal income tax have remained stable since
1997-98.  Thus, the three rates of personal income tax at 10, 20 and 30
percent have continued till date with some changes in the associated tax
brackets.  The surcharge at the rate of 5 percent of the tax payable
imposed in the wake of the Kargil war in 2002-03 on all income tax
assesses was discontinued in 2003-04, but a separate surcharge of 10
percent of the tax payable was imposed on all tax payers having taxable
income above Rs. 0.85 million, which was raised to Rs. 1 million in the
budget of 2005-06. Further, all taxes are topped up by 2 percent
education cess from 2004-05 onwards. Although the exemption limit
remained at Rs. 50,000 since 1998-99, the generous standard
deduction, exemption of dividend and interest on government securities
upto specified limits effectively increased the threshold substantially.
The 2004-05 budget did not raise the exemption limit but provided that
those with income less than Rs. 1,00,000 need not pay the tax, but
retained the existing tax brackets.  This gave rise to a peculiar problem
those with taxable incomes more than Rs. 100,000 were left with lower
after tax incomes when compared with those with incomes marginally
lower than Rs. 100,000. Therefore, modifications had to be made in the
Finance Act providing for a rebate when the income was in excess of
Rs. 1,00,000, a rebate equivalent to the difference between the amount
of tax payable and the amount of income in excess of Rs. 1,00,000.  The
budget for 2005-06 raised the exemption limit itself to Rs. 1,00,000,
abolished standard deduction and made marginal changes in the tax
brackets.  The exemption limit for women was increased to Rs. 1,35,000
and for senior citizens, Rs. 185,000.  The savings in superannuating
schemes up to Rs. 1,00,000 was made deductible from the taxable
income. 
The  Income Tax Act has a provision to assess the value of
identifiable perquisites provided by companies to their employees and
include the same in the taxable income of the individual. The budget for
2005-06 goes a step further and classifies a range of other expenses by
the company, which provide indirect perquisites to the entire group of
employees, but are not directly assignable to any single employee.
These benefits are to be taxed through a `Fringe Benefits Tax’ to be paid
by the employer at 30 percent.  These include a pre-determined
proportion of a wide range of expenses by the company, such as,20
entertainment, conference, employee welfare, sales promotion including
publicity, conveyance, tour and travel, including foreign travel expenses
and use of telephone.
In the case of corporate income taxes too the tax structure has
remained stable since 1997-98 when the rate was brought down to 35
percent.  On the issue of taxing dividends, however, there have been
frequent changes and lack of direction.  In 1997-98, the 10 percent
dividend tax was shifted from individuals to companies.  As mentioned
above, there was lack of consistency in the treatment of tax on
dividends.  In 2005-06, corporate income tax was reduced to 30 percent
on domestic companies.  A surcharge of 10 percent (without any
conditions regarding installed capacity increases) is also chargeable.
The depreciation rate, however, has been reduced to 15 percent in the
case of general plant and machinery, but initial depreciation is set at 20
percent, thereby reducing the overall benefit of reduction in corporate
income tax rates. 
The most important reform in recent years is in tax
administration. Expansion of the scope of tax deduction at source (TDS)
is one of the significant measures to reach the ‘hard to tax’ groups.
Further, every individual living in large cities covered under any one of
the six conditions (ownership of house, cars, membership of a club,
ownership of credit card, foreign travel, and subscriber of a telephone
connection) is necessarily required to file a tax return. While the issue of
permanent account numbers (PAN) has been simplified by outsourcing it
to the UTI Investors’ Services Ltd., the work on Tax Information
Networking (TIN) has been outsourced to the National Securities
Depository Ltd., (NSDL).  Strengthening the information system through
the TIN, alongwith processing and matching the information from various
sources on a selective basis is an important initiative, that is likely to
improve tax compliance. 
3.3  Reform of Indirect Taxes
 
Union Excise Duties
After independence, in order to raise revenues excise duty was
levied on selected goods.  Over the years, as the revenue requirement
increased, the list of commodities subject to tax was expanded.  In doing
so, in the initial years the emphasis was to include raw materials and21
intermediate goods rather than final consumer goods for reasons of
administrative convenience (India, 1977).  However, in later years with
greater pressure to raise revenues final consumer goods were included.
In 1975-76, the tax was extended to all manufactured goods.
The structure of excise duties by the middle of 1970s was
complex and highly distortionary. Some commodities were subject to
specific duties and others to ad valorem taxes, and on the latter alone
there were 24 different rates varying from 2 to 100 percent (excluding
tobacco and petroleum products which were taxed at higher rates). The
process of conversion of specific duties was more or less completed by
1993-94; however, this did not imply a decrease in the number of rates.
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This led to several classification disputes.  In effect, this was a
manufacturers’ sales tax administered on the basis of goods cleared
from the godowns. “Cascading” from the tax resulted not merely from its
pre-retail nature but also because it was levied on inputs, capital goods
as well as final consumer goods.  The tax system was complex and
opaque and the detailed analysis by Ahmad and Stern (1983) showed
significant variation in the effective rates.
Although the Indirect Tax Enquiry Report (India, 1977) provided
a detailed analysis of the allocative and distributional consequences of
Union Excise Duties, its recommendations were not implemented for
almost a decade until 1986-87.  The rationalisation recommendations
included conversion of the specific duties into ad valorem, unification of
rates and introduction of input tax credit to convert the cascading type
manufacturers’ sales tax into a manufacturing stage value added tax
(MANVAT).  The interesting part of the reform was that there was
virtually no preparation and the introduction of MODVAT was a “learning
by doing” process.  This was a strange combination of taxation based on
physical verification of goods with provision for input tax credit. The
coverage of the credit mechanism too evolved over time – it started with
items from select chapters on both the inputs side and the output side,
where the credit mechanism was based on a one-to-one correspondence
between inputs and outputs. It was only by 1996-97, however, that it
covered majority of commodities in the excise tariff and incorporated
comprehensive credit. Nowhere else in the world can one find VAT
introduction so complicated in its structure and so difficult in its
operations and so incomplete in its coverage.  In fact, the revenue from
the tax as a ratio of GDP showed a decline after the introduction of
MODVAT.22
Further reform impetus on excise duties came with the
implementation of the recommendations of the TRC.  The measures
included gradual unification of rates, greater reliance on account based
administration.  In 1999-00, almost 11 tax rates were merged into three
with a handful of “luxury” items subject to two non-vatable additional
rates (6 and 16%).  These were further merged into a single rate in 2000-
01 to be called a Central VAT (CenVAT), along with three special
additional non-vatable excises (8%, 16% and 24%) for a few
commodities.  Further, the base of the tax was widened – some
exemptions were replaced by a tax at 8 percent.  Some simplification of
the tax on small scale sector was also attempted  they could either
avail exemption or pay tax at a concessional rate of 60 percent of tax
due, with access to the tax credit mechanism. This option however was
withdrawn from the budget of 2005-06.
Customs Duties
Contrary to the general patterns seen in low income countries
where overwhelming proportion of revenues is raised from international
trade taxes, revenue from this source was not very large in the initial
years of independent India (Chelliah, 1986).  This is explained by the
quantitative restrictions placed on imports.  In addition, high and
differentiated tariffs and with rates varying with stage of production (lower
rates on inputs and higher rates on finished goods) and income elasticity
of demand (lower rates on necessities and higher rates on luxury items
of consumption) resulted not only in high and widely varying effective
rates of protection, but provided larger premium for inefficiency and
unintended distortions in the allocation of resources.  
By the mid 1980s, the tariff rates were very high and the
structure complex.  The Long Term Fiscal Policy (LTFP) presented in the
Parliament in 1985-86 emphasised the need to reduce tariffs, have fewer
and more uniform rates, and reduce and eventually eliminate quantitative
restrictions on imports.  The reforms undertaken, however, were not
comprehensive.  Rationalisation in the rates was attempted for specific
industries such as capital goods, drug intermediates, and electronic
goods.  In fact, contrary to the LTFP recommendations, the tariffs were
raised for revenue reasons and the weighted average rate increased
from 38 percent in 1980-81 to 87 percent in 1989-90 (India, 1991).
Thus, by 1990-91, the tariff structure was highly complex varying from 023
to 400 percent; over 10 percent of imports were subject to more than 120
percent.  Wide ranging exemptions granted by issuing notifications made
the system complex and was a reflection of the influence of various
special interest groups on tax policy. 
The reform of import duties in earnestness actually started in
1991-92 when all duties above 150 percent were reduced to this level to
be called the “peak” rate, which was brought down in the next four years
to 50 percent by 1995-96 and further to 40 percent in 1997-98, 30
percent in 2002-03, 25 percent in 2003-04 and finally to 15 percent in
2005-06 for non-agricultural goods.  Along with relaxation of quantitative
restrictions on imports and exchange rate depreciation, the change in the
tariffs constituted a major change in the foreign trade regime in the
country. 
The number of major duty rates was reduced from 22 in 1990-91
to 4 in 2003-04.   Of course, some items are outside these four rates, but
90 percent of the customs is collected from items under the four rates.
At the same time, a special additional duty (SAD) was imposed on the
rationale that if the commodity was domestically produced and sold on
inter-state sale, it would have attracted the tax rate of 4 percent.  This
was however, abolished in January, 2004 and subsequently reintroduced
in 2005-06, with a maximum rate of 4 percent and called CVD.   Thus,
the direction of reforms was not always consistent, but over the years,
the attempt has been to reduce the rates and reduce their dispersion.
However, the pattern of tariffs with the rates varying with every stage of
processing has continued and this has caused very high effective rates
of protection on assembling of consumer durables and luxury items of
consumption. 
Service Tax
An interesting aspect of the tax assignment system in India is
that barring  the case of a few specified services assigned to the states
such as entertainment tax, passengers and goods tax and electricity
duty, the services were not specifically assigned to either the centre or
the states and therefore, consumption tax system largely remained
untouched.  This violated the principle of neutrality in consumption as it
discriminated against the goods component of consumption.  As services
are relatively more income elastic, the tax system is rendered less
progressive when these are not taxed.  Even more important argument24
for taxing services is to enable a co-ordinated calibration of a
consumption tax system on goods and services as in the production
chain, services enter into goods and vice-versa.
Although there is no specific entry in the central list to tax
services, the central government levied tax on three services namely,
non-life insurance, stock brokerage and telecommunications in 1994-95.
The list was expanded in succeeding years to include over 80 services at
present.  Although initially taxed at 5 percent the rate was increased to 8
percent in 2003-04 and further to 10 percent in 2004-05.  The Expert
Group on Taxation of Services (India, 2001) recommended the extension
of the tax to all services along with the provision of input tax credit for
both goods and services and subsequently, integration with the CenVAT.
These reforms eventually were to evolve a manufacturing stage VAT.
The exceptions were to be two small lists – one, a list of exempt services
and the second, a negative list of services, where tax credit mechanism
would not cover taxes paid on these services. The recommendation on
the levy of general taxation of services has not been implemented and
the tax continues to be levied on selective services.  However, the
recommendation pertaining to the extension of input tax credit for goods
entering into services and vice versa has been implemented.
3.4  State Level Tax Reforms
Tax reforms at the state level were not coordinated with those at
the centre.  While individual state governments tried to appoint
committees from time to time and reform their tax structures, there was
no systematic attempt to streamline the reform process even after 1991
when market oriented reforms were introduced.  Most of the reform
attempts were ad hoc and were guided by exigencies of revenue rather
than attempts to modernise the tax system.  In some cases, even when
systematic studies were done, the recommendations were hardly
implemented.
13  The pace of tax reforms in the states accelerated in the
latter half of the 1990s when there were increasing pressures on their
budgets and, in some cases, owing to the conditions imposed by
multilateral lending agencies or to meet the targets set by the medium
term fiscal reforms facility.  A major landmark in co-ordinated tax reform
at the state level was in simplifying and rationalising the sales tax system
since the beginning of this decade and the introduction of value added
tax in 21 states from April 1, 2005, in place of the existing cascading type
sales tax .25
While a good deal of progress has been made in reforming the
union excise duties into a manufacturing stage VAT, the reform in the
states’ sales tax systems has lagged behind.  These reforms are critical
from the viewpoint of efficiency, for, they contribute over 60 percent of
states’ tax revenues.  Besides, in order to evolve a co-ordinated
consumption tax system in the country, it is important to calibrate the
reforms in the sales tax systems alongside reforming the central excise
duty regime. 
A systematic discussion on evolving a coordinated consumption
tax system in the country was initiated in the report on Reform of
Domestic Trade Taxes in India prepared by the NIPFP (1994).  The
report examined alternative models for a coordinated consumption tax
system for India and studied the feasibility of (i) centralising sales taxes
and unifying the levy with excise duties; (ii) giving the states the power to
levy all domestic indirect taxes with a corresponding reduction in tax
devolution; and (iii) evolving an independent dual VAT at central and
state levels with no credit to be paid for the payment of the central taxes
by the states and vice versa.  The report favoured the last solution as the
most practicable in Indian context as it maintains a balance between
sub-national fiscal autonomy and central government’s fiscal capacity to
undertake any desired inter-state redistribution.  Similar conclusion was
reached earlier by Burgess and Stern (1993) as well, while subsequent
analysis of Joshi and Little (1996) favours either centralisation or
assigning of all indirect taxes either to the centre or to the states.
However, considerations of fiscal autonomy and demands on the central
government to effect sizeable inter-regional resource transfers as well as
the political acceptability have tilted the decision in favour of the dual
VAT scheme as a medium term goal (NIPFP, 1994; Rao, 1998).  While
the desirability of having a centralised goods and services tax from the
viewpoint of evolving a harmonised consumption tax system is not
disputed, this can be taken only as a long term goal. In the medium term,
as a part of the initiative to introduce dual VAT, it has been decided to
convert the cascading type of state level sales taxes into a destination-
based VAT.
There are a number of arguments for replacing the prevailing
state sales tax with destination based VAT.  In most states, sales taxes
are levied at the first point and this pre-retail tax makes the base narrow.
The multiplicity of rates made the tax system complex.  The taxation of26
inputs and capital goods contribute to cascading, vertical integration of
firms and opaqueness.  In an imperfect market characterised by mark-up
pricing, the taxes on inputs and capital goods results in a tax on tax, and
mark up on the tax with consumers paying much more than the revenues
collected by the government.  Inter-state competition in providing liberal
tax incentives, besides distorting resource allocation involved significant
cost to the exchequer in tax expenditures.  The tax on inter-state sale
combined with input and capital goods taxation have caused significant
inter-state tax exportation from rich to poorer states.  In addition, in many
states, the urban local bodies impose a tax on the entry of goods into a
local area for consumption, use or sale.
14  With this, there are taxes on
both exports from one state to another and on imports into urban local
body jurisdiction.  Thus the country was divided into several tariff zones,
limiting the scope and the gains from a common market.  Above all, with
independent and overlapping commodity tax systems at central and state
levels, co-ordinated and harmonised development of domestic trade
taxes has become difficult.
As a part of the dual VAT design, therefore, the study group
recommended the levy of a separate destination-based, consumption
type retail stage VAT in place of the existing sales taxes by the states.
In order to persuade the states to rationalise their tax systems on the
lines recommended by the study group, the Government of India
appointed a State Finance Ministers’ Committee.  The committee made
recommendations to switch over to the VAT in a given time frame in
stages.  Eventually the committee was transformed into the Empowered
Committee of State Finance Ministers.  It recommended adoption of the
floor rates by the states to minimise the “race to the bottom”.  The
committee also recommended adoption of VAT in 2003, which was
repeatedly postponed, until April 2005, when 21 states finally switched
over to VAT.  
Although characterised as adoption of VAT, the reform in April,
2005 only extends the sales tax up to the retail stage with credit allowed
of taxes paid on inter-state purchases for all intra-state sales, and inter-
state sales.  Inter-state sales tax, i.e., central sales tax will continue to be
levied in the same form in the initial years of the introduction of the new
tax.  It is proposed to phase out the inter-state sales tax in the next two
years.  In this sense, the reform is only a transitional measure to achieve
the ultimate objective of having a destination based retail stage VAT. 27
The salient features of the VAT levied in the states from April, 2005 are
summarised in the following:
•  The tax is levied at two rates namely, 4 percent and 12.5 percent
(except for bullion and specie and precious metals, which are taxed
at 1%).  Basic necessities (about 75 items) are exempted.  Most
items of common consumption, inputs and capital goods (about 275)
are taxed at 4 percent and all other items are taxed at 12.5 percent.
Petrol and diesel (which contribute about 40% of sales tax) are kept
outside the VAT regime and a floor rate of 20 percent sales tax will
be levied on them.
•  The facility of tax credit covers both inputs/purchases as well as
capital goods for manufacturers as well as dealers. As regards
capital goods, credit for taxes paid can be availed against sales over
three years.
•  The tax credit mechanism operates in full only in the case of intra-
state sale. In inter-state transactions, the exporting state is supposed
to give input tax credit for locally made purchases, against the
collection of CST. . The tax credit of CST in the importing state, or
other mechanisms of zero-rating of inter-state sales, will be extended
after two years when the CST in its present form will be phased out.
In the mean time, an information system for inter-state trade will be
built up and ICICI Infotech has been contracted to undertake the
task.
•  The central government has agreed to compensate for any loss of
revenue during the first three years of the introduction of tax on rates
of 100 percent, 75 percent and 50 percent respectively.  The loss will
be calculated by estimating the difference between the projected
revenue from sales tax on the 2004-05 base and the actual revenue
collected.  The projected revenues will be estimated by applying the
average of the best three years’ growth rates during the last five
years.
•  Tax incentives given to new industries by different states could be
continued so long as they do not break the VAT chain.  Many states
propose to convert tax holidays into deferment of the tax.
•  All dealers having turnover above Rs. 5,00,000 would be required to
register for VAT.  However, the states may levy a simple turnover tax
not exceeding 2 percent on those dealers having upto Rs. 5 million
turnover.   They need not keep detailed accounts of their
transactions.  But, these small dealers will not be a part of the VAT28
chain and no credit will be available for the taxes paid on purchases
from these dealers. They may, however, voluntarily register as
regular VAT dealers.  
Altogether, the commitment to implement VAT has been made
by 18 states and 5 union territories from April, 2005.  Haryana has
already implemented the VAT from April, 2004, but with three main
rates (4%, 10% and 12%).  Eight states including Gujarat, Madhya
Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh have stayed out of the
system. 
Issues of Design and Implementation 
The introduction of VAT is a major reform exercise and it is not
surprising that the measure would lead to some confusion and
uncertainty. However, there are two sets of issues that need to be
highlighted: (a) the ad hoc manner of introduction of the tax, captured in
the lack of preparedness on the part of many of the states on the one
hand, and  lack of firm decisions on the design and structure of the tax,
even a few months after the introduction of the new tax. Educational and
awareness programmes for the dealers and public at large have been
generally inadequate in several states. Some states started off the new
regime without any rules and forms in place. Even the tax officials are
not clear about many issues. In other words, this switchover can in no
terms be called a planned switchover. (b) Certain shortcomings in the
design of the tax are summarised below:
•  The difference of 8.5 percentage points between the tax rates on
inputs and outputs (4% and 12.5%) tend to reduce tax compliance.
In fact, it is inappropriate to specify a lower rate on inputs in a VAT
system because, in any case, full credit is available for taxes paid on
inputs used in the production against the tax payable on final
product.  Many commodities are used as inputs as well as final
consumer goods and the lower rate implies a loss of revenue on the
latter kind of transactions. A manufacturer might prefer to pay the
input tax at 4 percent, suppress his sale and evade the tax on the
final product as the difference between the tax payable on the
outputs and the tax paid on inputs is large.  In fact, no country in the
world operating VAT permits concessional treatment of inputs.  The
large tax differential also encourages large scale lobbying to shift
more items from the higher rate to the lower rate category. In fact,29
from the viewpoint of better tax compliance, it would have been
better to choose rates like 4 percent and 10 percent. 
•  It would have been better to stipulate the two tax rates as floor rates
rather than uniform rates.  The only condition should have been that
no state should levy the tax at more than two rates and the items
under the two categories could have been specified.  This would
have provided a degree of autonomy to the states and potentially
reduced the need for compensation.
•  Another important issue is the application of VAT on maximum retail
price (MRP) at the first point on pharmaceuticals and drugs in West
Bengal and Maharashtra.  The rationale for this is that there cannot
be value addition at subsequent stages once the MRP is taken as
the base.  This goes against the principle of VAT  of collecting the
tax at different stages of value added with credit given to the tax paid
at the previous stage. Further, this would put in place two different
mechanisms for taxation within the same state, as also for a given
dealer, a complication both for administration and compliance.
Further work required to ensure successful implementation of the
VAT is discussed in section 5.
4.  Trends in Indian Tax Revenues
This section presents an analysis of the trends in tax revenue in
India.  After examining the aggregate trends, the analysis is extended to
the trends in direct and indirect taxes at central and state levels.  The
section focuses on the changes in the level and composition of tax
revenue since 1991 when systematic reforms were first set in motion.
The analysis shows that despite initiating systematic reforms, the
revenue productivity of the tax system has not shown any appreciable
increase and the decline in the tax ratio due to reduction in customs duty
could not be compensated by internal indirect taxes.
The trends in tax revenue in India show four distinct phases
(Table 1; Figures 1 and 2).  In the first, there was a steady increase in
the tax-GDP ratio from 6.3 percent in 1950-51 to 16.1 percent in 1987-
88.  In the initial years of planning, increase in tax ratio was necessitated
by the need to finance large public sector plans.  It was possible to30
increase the ratio from a low base in the initial years.  In addition,
increasing imports and extension of manufacturing excises to raw
materials and intermediate goods and later, to all manufactured goods
increased the buoyancy.  Thus, the tax ratio increased from a mere 6.3
percent to 10.4 percent in 1970-71 and further to 13.8 percent in 1980-
81.  The increase continued until it peaked to 16.1 percent in 1987-88.
The buoyancy of the tax in later years in this phase was fuelled by the
economy attaining a higher growth path and progressive substitution of
quantitative restrictions with protective tariffs following initial attempts at
liberalisation in the late 1980s.  
The second phase began with the recession caused by the
severe drought of 1987 and was marked by stagnation in revenues.  This
was followed by a decline in the tax ratio following the economic crisis of
1991 and the subsequent reforms in the tax system, particularly,
reduction in tariffs.    Thus, in the third phase, the tax ratio declined from
15.8 percent in 1991-92 to the lowest level of 13.4 percent in 1997-98
and fluctuated around 13-14 percent until 2001-02.  The subsequent
period has seen increase by over one percentage point in the tax ratio to
15.2 percent in 2003-04 (revised estimates for the centre and budget
estimates for the states).  The aggregate tax – GDP ratio is yet to reach
the levels that prevailed before systematic tax reforms were initiated in
1991.
Interestingly, the trends in tax ratios of direct and indirect taxes
follow different paths.  In the case of the former, the tax ratio remained
virtually stagnant throughout the forty year period from 1950 to 1990 at a
little over 2 percent of GDP.  Thereafter, coinciding with the reforms
marked by significant reduction in the tax rates and simplification of the
tax structure, the direct taxes increased sharply to over 4 percent in
2003-04 and is expected to be at about 4.5 percent in 2004-05.  In
contrast, much of the increase in the tax ratio during the first 40 years of
planned development in India came from indirect taxes, which as a
proportion of GDP increased by over three times from 4 percent in 1950-
51 to 13.5 percent in 1991-92.  However, in the subsequent period, it
declined to about 10.6 percent before recovering to a little over 11
percent.  The decline in the tax ratio in recent years was mainly due to
lower buoyancy of indirect taxes.  31
Table 1 :Trends in Tax Revenue in India
(percent of GDP)
Centre States Total
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
1950-51 1.8 2.3 4.1 0.6 1.7 2.2 2.3 4.0 6.3
1960-61 1.7 3.5 5.2 0.6 2.0 2.7 2.3 5.5 7.9
1970-71 1.9 5.1 7.0 0.3 3.1 3.4 2.2 8.2 10.4
1980-81 2.1 7.1 9.2 0.2 4.4 4.6 2.3 11.5 13.8
1985-86 2.0 8.3 10.3 0.2 5.0 5.3 2.2 13.3 15.6
1987-88 1.9 8.7 10.6 0.2 5.2 5.4 2.1 14.0 16.1
1990-91 1.9 8.2 10.1 0.2 5.1 5.3 2.2 13.3 15.4
1991-92 2.4 8.0 10.3 0.2 5.3 5.5 2.6 13.3 15.8
1995-96 2.8 6.5 9.4 0.2 5.2 5.4 3.0 11.7 14.8
2000-01 3.3 5.8 9.0 0.2 5.4 5.6 3.4 11.2 14.6
2001-02 3.0 5.2 8.2 0.2 5.4 5.6 3.2 10.6 13.8
2002-03 3.4 5.4 8.8 0.2 5.7 5.9 3.5 11.1 14.6
2003-04* 3.8 5.4 9.2 0.2 5.8 6.0 4.0 11.2 15.2
2004-05# 4.3 5.6 9.9 Na na na na Na na
Note: *  Actual for the centre and revised estimate for states.  
          #  Revised estimates for centre.
n.a:        not available.
Source: Public Finance Statistics, 2003-04.  Ministry of Finance,  Government of India.323334












































































































The decline in the tax ratio observed above since 1987-88 has occured
mainly at the central level.  As central revenues constitute about 60
percent of the total tax revenues, fluctuation in central tax ratio impacts
significantly on the aggregate tax ratio in the country.  Notably, tax ratios
of both central and state governments increased sharply during the
period 1950-51 to 1985-86.  Thereafter, the tax ratio at the state level
was virtually stagnant at about 5.5 percent until 2001-02 and thereafter
showed a marginal increase to about 6 percent by 2003-04.  In contrast,
the central tax ratio increased to reach the peak in 1987-88, and
remained at that level until the fiscal crisis of 1991-92.  Subsequent
years have seen a sharp decline of over two percentage points to GDP
until 2001-02 and thereafter it recovered almost to the pre-1991 level in
2004-05 (revised estimates).  Within the central level, the share of direct
taxes has shown a steady increase from less than 20 percent in 1990-91
to over 43 percent in 2004-05.  While as mentioned earlier, the increase
in the tax ratio until the end of the 1980s was mainly due to the buoyancy
of indirect taxes, in subsequent years increase in the tax ratio from direct
taxes arrested the sharp decline seen in the tax ratio from indirect taxes.  
4.1  Analysis of Central Taxes
Interestingly, the comprehensive tax reform at the central level
was the direct consequence of economic crisis. As Bird (1993) after
observing tax reforms in many countries states, “…fiscal crisis has been
proven to be the mother of tax reform”.  However, unlike most ad hoc
reforms undertaken in response to economic crises, the tax reforms in
India were undertaken after a detailed analysis and the reform package
introduced in 1991 was systematic and the direction of reforms has
continued.  In fact, contrary to expectations, the period after the
introduction of reforms has seen a decline in the tax  GDP ratio from
10.3 percent in 1991-92 to 8.2 percent in 2001-02 at the central level,
before it recovered to about 10 percent in 2004-05.  This has prompted
many to ask whether the tax reforms caused the decline in the tax-GDP
ratio.  The contrary view is that the ratio declined in spite of the reforms.
The disaggregated analysis of the trends in central tax revenue
presented in table 2 (Figure 3) shows that sharpest decline in the tax 
GDP ratio was in indirect taxes  both customs duties and central35
excise duty.  The former declined by about 1.8 percentage points from
3.6 percent in 1991-92 to 1.8 percent in 2004-05 and the decline in the
latter was by one percentage point from 4.3 percent to 3.3 percent during
the period.  Interestingly, the tax ratio from both the taxes declined up to
2001-02 and have stabilised at that level and indicators are that while the
customs may continue to decline as tariff levels are further brought
down, the tax ratio from internal indirect taxes are likely to increase if
reforms towards improving the coverage of service tax and its integration
with CenVAT is undertaken and significant improvement in tax
administration is achieved.
In contrast to the indirect taxes, there has been a significant
increase in the revenue from direct taxes.  In fact, since the reforms were
introduced, the direct tax-GDP ratio more than doubled from about 2
percent in 1991-92 to 4.3 percent in 2004-05.  The increase was seen
both in personal income and corporate income taxes, the tax-GDP ratio
in the latter increasing by more than three times from 0.9 percent in
1991-92 to 2.7 percent in 2004-05.  The revenue from personal income
tax increased from 0.9 percent to 1.6 percent during the period.
The steady increase in the tax – GDP ratio in direct taxes has
resulted in increase in its share in total taxes.  In 1991-92, direct taxes
constituted less than one fifth of the total tax revenue of the central
government.  In 2004-05, it increased to 44 percent and in 2005-06, it
estimated at 48 percent.  Commensurately, there has been a decline in
the share of indirect taxes, from 80 percent in 1991-92 to 56 percent in
2004-05.  The customs duties which constituted 36 percent of central tax
revenue in 1991-92 contributed just about 18 percent in 2004-05, while
the share of central excise duty share declined from 43 percent to 33
percent.36
Table 2 : Level and Composition of Central Tax Revenue
PIT CIT Direct Tax Customs Excise Indirect Total GDP
Percent of GDP
1985-86 1.0 1.1 2.1 3.6 4.9 8.8 10.9 100
1990-91 0.9 0.9 2.0 3.6 4.3 8.2 10.1 100
1995-96 1.3 1.4 2.8 3.0 3.4 6.5 9.4 100
2000-01 1.5 1.7 3.3 2.3 3.3 5.8 9.0 100
2001-02 1.4 1.6 3.0 1.8 3.2 5.2 8.2 100
2002-03 1.5 1.9 3.4 1.8 3.3 5.4 8.8 100
2003-04 1.5 2.3 3.8 1.8 3.3 5.4 9.2 100
2004-05 1.6 2.7 4.3 1.8 3.3 5.6 9.9 100
2005-06 1.9 3.1 5.0 1.5 3.5 5.5 10.5 100
Percent of Total Tax Revenue
1985-86 9.2 10.1 19.3 33.0 45.0 80.7 100
1990-91 9.3 9.3 19.2 35.9 42.6 80.8 100
1995-96 14.0 14.8 30.2 32.1 36.1 69.8 100
2000-01 16.8 18.9 36.2 25.2 36.3 63.8 100
2001-02 17.1 19.6 37.0 21.5 38.8 63.0 100
2002-03 17.0 21.3 38.4 20.7 38.1 64.5 100
2003-04 16.3 25.0 41.3 19.1 35.7 61.3 100
2004-05* 16.6 27.1 43.9 18.4 32.9 56.1 100
2005-06# 17.9 29.9 47.9 14.4 32.8 52.1 100
Note: * Revised Estimates;  # Budget Estimates
Source: Estimate of Revenues, Central Budget (various years).37














































The decline in the share of customs revenue is certainly to be
expected when the tariff rates are sharply brought down in the wake of
external liberalisation.  In fact, the decline could have been even faster
but for the hesitancy on the part of the Finance Ministry to reduce the
tariffs due to the demands of the domestic industry.  The declining trend
in customs revenue is likely to continue.   In fact, it was expected that
increasing imports due to liberalisation will offset the effect of rate
reduction, i.e., rate reduction being offset by base expansion.  However,
although imports have shown a significant increase after liberalisation
(Panagariya, 2005), it was not enough to balance the revenues.   One
reason for this could be the large scale exemptions.  Although the
coverage of exemptions has not been expanded in a major way, the
expansion in the base that should have accompanied a reduction in the
rates of tax was not accomplished through reduction in the exemptions.
The declining trend in excise duties throughout the 1980s was
due to the fact that the rate structure implemented when input tax credit
was allowed was perhaps not revenue neutral.  Continued exemption of
small scale sector and increase in the turnover limit to define the small
scale upto a turnover of Rs. 1 crore, widespread use of area-based
exemptions are other important reasons for the decline in the excise
duties.  Equally, if not more important is the fact that due to the poor
information system, it was possible to claim excessive input tax credit.
Further, since 1997-98 over 75 percent of the increase in the GDP is
attributable to the growth of service sector, and the manufacturing sector
has been relatively stagnant, implying an automatic reduction in the ratio
of taxes on manufacturing base as a percentage of total GDP.  
In contrast to indirect taxes, the revenue from direct taxes has
shown a steady increase. Revenues from both personal income tax and
corporate income tax have increased over the years.   The major reason
attributed for the increase is the improved tax compliance arising from
reduction in marginal tax rates.  There are no rigorous studies, though
the increase in revenue from personal income tax since 1996-97 is
attributed to improved compliance arising from reduction in marginal tax
rates.  Of course, there is some independent evidence on the
improvement in tax compliance since 1991 (Das-Gupta and Mookherjee,
1997; Das-Gupta, 2002).39
4.2  Level, Composition and Trends in State Taxes
Table 3 presents the trends in states’ tax revenues.  It is seen
from the table that the revenue from state taxes as a ratio of GDP was
virtually stagnant throughout the 1990s fluctuating around 5 to 5.7
percent.   In fact, from 1994-95, the tax ratio shows a decline to bottom
out at 5.1 percent in 1998-99, the year in which the states had to revise
the pay scales exacerbating their fiscal problems.  In subsequent years,
there has been a steady improvement in the tax ratio to touch 6 percent
in 2003-04.
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1990-91 0.2 3.2 0.9 0.4 0.5 0.3 5.1 5.5
1991-92 0.2 3.4 0.9 0.4 0.5 0.4 5.4 5.7
1992-93 0.2 3.2 0.9 0.4 0.5 0.3 5.1 5.5
1993-94 0.2 3.3 0.9 0.4 0.5 0.3 5.2 5.5
1994-95 0.2 3.3 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.3 5.3 5.5
1995-96 0.2 3.0 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.5 5.2 5.4
1996-96 0.2 3.2 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.3 5.1 5.2
1997-98 0.1 3.2 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.3 5.2 5.4
1998-99 0.1 3.1 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.3 5.0 5.1
1999-00 0.1 3.2 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.3 5.2 5.3
2000-01 0.2 3.5 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.4 5.4 5.7
2001-02 0.2 3.4 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.4 5.4 5.7
2002-03 0.2 3.5 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.3 5.7 5.9
2003-04 0.2 3.6 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.3 5.8 6.0
Of the different state taxes, sales tax is predominant and
constitutes about 60 percent of total state tax revenues.  Therefore, not
surprisingly, the overall trend in states’ tax ratio follows closely the trends
in sales tax revenue.  The revenue from sales tax after reaching a low of
3.1 percent in 1998-99, has increased marginally to 3.5 percent in 2000-
01.  It has remained at that level thereafter.  Any attempt to improve the
revenue productivity of states’ tax system, therefore, is inextricably40
intertwined with the reform of sales tax system and in this respect, the
recent reform of moving towards a destination based VAT is extremely
important.
  
State excise duty is a sumptuary tax on alcoholic products.  In
some states, in addition to the state excise duty, a good proportion of the
tax is collected from sales of alcoholic products.  In regard to this tax,
there has always been a problem of balancing regulatory and revenue
considerations.  The major components of the tax come from arrack and
country liquor on the one hand and ‘India Made Foreign Liquor’ (IMFL),
including beer on the other.  The duty is collected by way of licence fee
on the sale/auction of vends and taxes on the consumption of liquor.
The problem in regard to country liquor has been the brewing and
consumption of illicit liquor and this has not only caused loss of revenue,
but has been an important health hazard.  As regards IMFL, the
Karnataka Tax Reforms Committee estimated that the actual evasion of
the tax may be as high as three times the actual revenue collected
(Karnataka, 2001).  The way to deal with this problem has more to do
with strengthening the tax administration and information system and
less to do with the structure of the tax.
The principal source of stamp duties and registration fees is from
the sale of immovable property transactions.  In fact, the levy of stamp
duties in addition to registration fee, adds to the marginal tax rates, which
in any case are very high.  Not surprisingly, the most important problem
afflicting this tax is undervaluation of the value of the property transacted.
A part of the reason for this lies in the high rates of tax.  Undervaluation
of immovable property is aided by lack of organised market.
Development of organised market for urban immovable property
transactions is hindered by the high rate of stamp duties and registration
fees and other policies such as the Rent Control Act and Urban Land
Ceiling Act.  In fact, until recently, the tax rates were as high as 12 to 15
percent on the value of transactions (NIPFP, 1996).  Many of the states
which reduced the rates have found the typical working of the “Laffer
curve” phenomenon and have initiated reforms to reduce the rates in this
direction.  In Karnataka for example, the tax rate was reduced from 16
percent in 2001-02 to 8 percent in 2002-03 and thus witnessed 30
percent growth of revenue from stamp duties during the period.  
The other important component of state taxes are the taxes on
transport comprising of motor vehicles tax and passengers and goods41
tax.  For administrative convenience, many states have merged the latter
with an additional motor vehicles tax.   Also the motor vehicles tax on
private non-commercial vehicles has been converted into a life time tax
by adding up ten years’ tax or by adopting a similar formula.  The reform
in this area has to separate the motor vehicles tax from passengers’ and
goods tax and the latter should eventually become part of the state VAT
rather than a separate tax.  Similarly, the taxes on entertainment,
electricity duty and luxury tax on hotels and restaurants should also be
merged with the VAT.
At the local level there are two taxes of some significance.
These are the taxes on property and in some states, octroi levied by
urban local bodies.  The major problem with urban property taxes, like in
the case of registration fees is undervaluation.  Alternative models of
reform – of using the capital value or rental value for valuing the property
have been suggested.   The ultimate reform depends on the
development of organised property market.  In most cases the
recommendations suggested have been to use the guided value
determined in some independent manner.  As regards octroi, this check-
post based levy is not only impeding internal trade and violating the
principle of common market, but is also a source of corruption and rent
seeking.
5.   Analysis of the Trends and Economic Impact
of the Tax System
In this section, the observed trends in different central and state
taxes are explained in greater detail and the possible efficiency and
equity implications of different taxes is analysed.  Specifically, the
analysis seeks to raise a number of questions.  These include, whether
tax compliance has improved over the years in response to reduction in
marginal tax rates? What other factors influence revenue productivity of
the tax system?  What are the efficiency and equity implications of the
tax system? 42
Personal Income Tax
The increase in revenue productivity of personal income tax is
attributed to the improvement in tax compliance arising from the sharp
reduction in marginal tax rates in 1991-92 and 1996-97.  This is also the
period when the growth of GDP itself had decelerated.  This is reflected
in the negative correlation between effective tax rates and the ratio of
income tax collections to GDP, akin to a Laffer curve.
16  While it is clearly
difficult to attribute increase in revenue productivity solely or even mainly
to reduction in marginal tax rates, Das-Gupta and Mookherjee (1997)
draws a tentative, but important conclusion on the improvement in overall
performance of the tax system.  In a more recent analysis, Das-Gupta
(2002), based on 16 different structural, administrative, and institutional
indicators concludes that the performance of the tax system has shown
improvement: tax compliance has indeed improved after reduction in
marginal tax rates.  
In a more recent analysis Bhalla (2005), estimates the aggregate
revenue elasticity at -1.43 percent and concludes that the 1996-97 tax
cut was a huge success in increasing revenues. The paper provides an
estimate of compliance by comparing the data published by the income
tax department, the coverage of which itself is narrow, with those from
other sources, particularly the NCAER to establish that the number of
people recording incomes within any given bracket for income tax
purposes, is significantly lower than the numbers recorded by other
surveys.  There are problems with this approach – especially for
proprietary firms and individual businesses as also association of
persons, where the distinction between expenditures of the firm and
expenditures of the individual for personal needs can be hard to make.
17
Nevertheless, the paper helps to focus on the need for some informed
debate and analysis in this area. 
The important point is that it is not appropriate to attribute
improvement in revenue productivity of personal income tax since 1996-
97 solely or even mainly to reduction in the marginal rate of tax.  The
information presented in table 4 shows that the main reason for the
increase in revenues is the administrative arrangement extending the
scope of tax deduction at source.  The proportion of tax deducted at
source (TDS) to total revenue collections actually declined from 42
percent in 1990-91 to 22 percent in 1994-95.  It increased to 50 percent
following the expansion in the scope of TDS in 1996-97 and further to 6743
percent in 2001-02 before declining marginally to 64 percent in 2003-04.
As a proportion of GDP, the ratio of collections from TDS increased by
0.67 percentage points over the period considered. When compared with
the increase of 0.56 percentage points increase in ratio of personal
income tax collections to GDP, this suggests that the improved
compliance is largely if not solely owing to improved coverage or greater
effectiveness of TDS as a tool for collecting taxes.  














1990-91 41.75 36.00 6188.37 827.74 0.45
1991-92 48.22 33.29 7523.97 794.79 0.55
1992-93 42.91 33.45 9060.79 1165.44 0.52
1993-94 19.65 51.77 14106.25 4045.96 0.32
1994-95 22.18 56.87 17178.72 3357.76 0.37
1995-96 22.21 50.01 22949.61 6462.48 0.42
1996-97 50.87 27.30 20042.48 1808.49 0.75
1997-98 50.87 24.10 19270.19 2169.60 0.64
1998-99 52.44 23.59 22411.98 2171.83 0.67
1999-00 53.69 24.58 28684.29 3029.79 0.80
2000-01 63.22 20.89 35162.61 3398.63 1.06
2001-02 67.10 19.23 35358.00 3354.00 1.04
2002-03 65.55 20.26 42119.00 5253.00 1.12
2003-04 64.03 20.04 48454.00 7067.00 1.12
Source:  Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General (Direct Taxes)
 Government of India (various years). 
Interestingly, although it is tempting to attribute this to extension
of TDS to interest, dividends, payments to contractors and insurance
commission, the increase has come about mainly in TDS in salaries.
(Table 5) The TDS in salaries in 1992-93 constituted only 25 percent of
total TDS, and it increased to 50 percent in 1999-2000 and thereafter
declined to 41 percent, as TDS from payments to non-residents and
others and payments to contractors increased substantially.  It is also
seen that the substantial increase in 1996-97 in TDS and corresponding
decline in advance tax is accompanied by a sharp increase in the
refunds, as well.  However, even after the refunds are adjusted, the
share of TDS in total receipts continues to remain high and increasing.
This implies that the contribution of TDS to incremental revenue is
increasing as well.44
















Salaries 25.15 42.05 50.43 48.99 47.82 44.56 41.23
Interest 40.15 25.25 25.85 19.91 21.39 18.37 16.63
Dividend 5.90 3.41 1.99 1.20 0.81 3.00 2.21
Winnings in
lotteries and races 1.02 0.66 0.78 0.29 0.23 0.37 0.41
Payments to
contractors 11.85 17.90 19.83 14.92 13.06 13.83 17.56
Insurance Comm.  1.21 0.97 0.93 0.72 1.05 1.05 1.01
Payments to Non-
residents & others 
14.71 9.77 0.18 13.98 15.64 18.83 20.94
Total  99.99 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Total TDS
collections
 (Rs crore) 6,210 13,788 18,546 28,213 30,672 36,568 42,955
Source: Report of the CAG of India, Direct Taxes, various issues.
Thus increase in the tax revenue has more to do with the rapid
growth of the organised sector, financialisation of the economy,
administrative measures on extending the TDS than improved
compliance arising from the reduction in marginal rates of tax. The
extension of PAN to cover larger number of potential taxpayers,
combined with expanded use of PAN on the one hand and the TIN on
the other are expected to advance this cause further, by generating an
extensive and reliable database. This however does not make out a case
for increasing the marginal tax rates, since such increases would be
associated with significant efficiency costs on the economy which are
then sought to be corrected/mitigated through exemptions and
concessions of various kinds. 
There has been a significant increase in the number of non-
corporate income tax assesses over the last decade.  In fact, during the
period 1999-00 to 2003-04 alone, the total number of personal income
tax assesses increased from 19.6 million to 28.8 million registering a
growth rate of over 10 percent per year (Table 6).  Interestingly, the
highest growth was seen in the income range of Rs. 0.2-0.5 million
(38.4%) followed by those above Rs. 1 million (16%).   The important
thing to note is that the number of taxpayers in the country is still small45
considering the growing “middle class”.  Second, although the taxpayers
with income above Rs. 1 million are growing, it still constitutes a small
number as well as proportion to the total.  There were only about
1,00,000 taxpayers in this group constituting about 0.3 percent of the
total taxpayers.
Table 6: Income Range-wise Income Tax Assesses
Number of Taxpayers
Million
Percent of Taxpayers in





1999-00 2003-04 Growth Rate 1999-00 2003-04
Less than 0. 2  18.75 26.55 9.1 95.8 92.08
0.2 – 0.5 0.49 1.80 38.4 2.50 6.24
0.5 – 1 0.26 0.37 9.2 1.32 1.28




0.015 0.012 (-) 5.43 0.08 0.04
Total  19.59 28.83 10.2 100 100
Source: Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General for the year ended March 2004,
Government of India, 2005.
It is important to understand the impact of reduction in the
marginal tax rate and reduction in the number of rate categories since
1991-92 on the overall progressivity and equity of the tax system.  Given
that the reform involved sharp reduction in the marginal tax rates, the
effective rate declines as the level of income increases.  It would be
tempting to conclude from the above that progressivity has declined and
overall equity in the tax system has worsened over the years.  Such a
conclusion would be inappropriate for, what this shows is that between
income taxpayers, the progressivity has declined.  Surely in 2003-04, as
many as 29 million people paid income tax as compared to about 3.9
million in 1989-90 and the tax paid by them now has doubled from less
than one percent of GDP to almost 2 percent of GDP.  The increase in
the number of taxpayers indicates improvement in horizontal equity since
more people with similar incomes now possibly pay the tax and the fact
that larger proportion of incomes are subject to tax now represents
improvement in vertical equity as well.
Corporate Income Tax46
Of the four major taxes considered, the revenue from the
corporation tax grew at the fastest rate during the 1990s.  As a ratio of
GDP, the revenue from the tax increased three times from 0.9 percent in
1990-91 to 2.7 percent in 2003-04, despite significant reduction in the
rates.  The reforms were mainly in terms of doing away with the
distinction between closely held and widely held companies, reduction in
the marginal tax rates to align it with the top marginal tax rate of personal
income tax, rationalising tax preferences  investment allowance and
depreciation allowance to a considerable extent.  In addition, the
introduction of MAT has also contributed to the revenues. 























Mining 2.41 5.20 10.55 11.47 12.88 18.66 22.45 18.27 21.97 13.92
Manufactur
Food products 6.75 3.69 2.96 3.88 4.55 4.77 4.76 3.67 3.43 3.46
Textiles 1.92 0.83 0.81 0.72 0.56 0.55 0.64 0.37 0.47 0.52
Leather 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.03
Paper and wood 1.61 2.29 0.78 0.53 0.44 0.75 0.89 0.94 0.58 0.74
Petro products 11.75 12.21 7.55 5.50 9.42 6.28 4.97 7.46 11.13 12.48
Chemicals 17.21 13.98 8.67 7.58 6.89 5.74 5.41 5.43 6.00 6.46
Rubber and plastics 0.87 0.63 0.70 0.64 0.93 0.80 0.51 0.47 0.61 0.50
Non-metallic
minerals 1.20 1.82 0.82 0.53 0.46 0.38 0.57 0.40 0.30 0.48
Basic metals and
products 3.84 4.70 4.32 3.08 3.60 4.45 4.22 2.95 2.86 6.09
Machinery 13.34 9.90 8.68 6.40 6.35 5.75 3.51 3.92 3.63 3.88
Transport equipment 8.80 10.84 9.41 6.37 5.65 4.61 2.41 3.06 3.96 5.31
Total: Manufacturing 67.33 60.93 44.74 35.27 38.9 34.19 27.96 28.69 32.99 39.95
Electricity gas and
steam 0.34 1.70 1.70 8.80 11.49 7.51 9.09 6.49 5.57 1.91
Construction  2.44 1.73 1.38 1.17 1.38 1.27 1.17 0.97 0.89 1.31
Wholesale and retail
trade 3.29 2.27 3.31 3.41 2.23 1.89 3.00 2.94 3.03 2.99
Hotels and
restaurants 1.15 1.37 0.97 0.62 0.53 0.35 0.38 0.23 0.21 0.21
Transport services 0.36 2.27 2.12 2.07 1.39 1.42 1.91 1.50 1.49 1.27
Post and telecom 10.07 7.91 6.13 5.95 7.58 4.29 5.72 6.35 2.61 6.5047
























intermediation 11.89 15.95 28.34 30.39 22.37 28.54 25.83 32.01 28.67 29.74
Real estate 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03
Computer, R&D and
other Business
services 0.67 0.60 0.64 0.72 1.06 1.46 2.19 2.21 2.13 1.79
Social services 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.19 0.39 0.31 0.32 0.40 0.40
Proportion of Total
CIT Collections 50.06 62.16 77.39 80.82 64.54 62.21 61.95 72.62 80.38 65.09
Source: Prowess database.
It would be instructive to analyse the contribution of various
sectors to corporation tax.  The contribution of manufacturing sector from
the prowess database accounts for two-thirds of the corporate tax
collections (Table 7).  The analysis shows that the manufacturing sector
contributed 40 percent of the corporation tax in 2004-05.  Within the
manufacturing sector, the petroleum sector contributed the highest
(12.5%) followed by chemicals (6.5%) and basic metal industry (6.1%).
In contrast, the contribution of textiles was just about 0.5 percent.  In fact,
in 1994-95 industries such as chemicals, machinery, transport equipment
contributed overwhelming proportion of corporation tax, but their share
declined sharply over the years.
Another important issue examined here refers to the contribution
of the public sector enterprises.  Curiously, the contribution by public
enterprises has shown significant increase since 1991.  In fact, the share
fell from 23 percent in 1990-91 to 19 percent in 1994-95, but increased
thereafter to constitute about 38 percent in 2002-03.  This meant that
over 40 percent of the increase in corporation tax was collected from
public enterprises (Table 8).   This is partly owing to the fact that public
enterprises do not undertake elaborate tax planning to minimise the
taxes unlike the private sector.  48
Table 8: Contribution of Public Sector











1990-91 1229.3 5335 23.04
1991-92 1674.11 7853 21.32
1992-93 1804.37 8899 20.28
1993-94 2109.93 10060 20.97
1994-95 2581.46 13822 18.68
1995-96 4186.66 16487 25.39
1996-97 5192.51 18567 27.97
1997-98 5634.11 20016 28.15
1998-99 6499.00 24529 26.50
1999-00 7706.25 30692 25.11
2000-01 9313.62 35696 26.09
2001-02 12254.32 36609 33.47
2002-03 17429.95 46172 37.75
Source: Public Enterprises Survey, Government of India (various years). 
Union Excise Duties
Declining tax-GDP ratio of union excise duties is truly a matter of
concern as this has been a constraint in reducing the import duties
further.  The reforms in union excise duties rather than improving the
revenue productivity have led to its decline over the years.  Although
during the last few years the revenue-GDP ratio from the tax has been
stagnant at 3.3 percent, it is significantly lower than the ratio in 1991-92
(4.1%).
Not only that the revenue productivity of union excise duty has
declined over the years, even the composition shows increase in
revenue concentration particularly towards commodities which would be
used in further production.  Independent operation of excise and sales
tax systems and confining the tax to goods and to the manufacturing
stage alone does not remove cascading and final products in the49
manufacturing stage are not necessarily final consumer goods  goods
transport vehicles being a prime example.  
The commodity-wise revenue collections from union excise duty
presented in table 9 bring out some interesting features with implications
on both efficiency and equity of the tax system.  One of the most
important features of the union excise duties is the commodity
concentration.  Just five groups of commodities namely petroleum
products, chemicals, basic metals, transport vehicles, and electrical and
electronic goods together contribute to 75 percent of total revenue
collections from excise duty.   It is normally expected that over the years,
with diversification in manufacturing, the commodity concentration in
excise duty should reduce.  Contrarily, the commodity concentration has
only increased over the years with a single group, petroleum products
contributing to over 40 percent of the union excise duty collections, with
more than three times increase in share over a 13-year period.   This
imposes disproportionate tax burden on different sectors of the economy.
Besides, this type of commodity concentration does not allow objective
calibration of policies in regard to excise duties as the Finance Ministry
would not like to lose revenue from this lucrative source.  
Another important consequence of the pattern of excise revenue
collections is that an overwhelming proportion of the duties is collected
from commodity groups which are in the nature of intermediate products,
used in the production of goods or services which are not subject to
excise.   Besides petroleum products, a significant proportion of which is
used in transportation of goods and persons involved in or related to
other kinds of manufacturing, the taxes on all goods serving as inputs to
service providers, especially of services used as inputs to manufacturing
activities, contribute to cascading and add to the production cost.
Transport vehicles and related industries are one such industry.  These
are a source of significant inefficiency in the system.  This also makes it
difficult to speculate on the distribution of tax burden in terms of different
income classes as it is difficult to speculate on the effect of the tax on
different manufacturing enterprises and its effects on employment and
incomes. 50
Table 9: Revenue from Union Excise Duties by Commodity Groups 
1990-91 1995-96 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04
Food products 4.01 3.55 4.80 4.38 4.53 3.67 3.57 3.24
Tobacco products 8.29 8.07 7.95 6.74 6.74 6.57 5.90 5.58
Minerals and ores 8.38 8.68 7.18 6.66 6.24 5.99 5.76 6.24
Petroleum
Products 13.93 12.39 22.46 29.56 32.91 38.32 40.37 40.99
Chemicals 11.15 14.42 11.14 9.79 10.17 9.86 9.31 8.86
Plastics and
articles thereof 2.50 4.04 4.21 3.66 2.28 2.38 2.39 2.52
Rubber products 4.93 4.62 2.90 2.65 2.16 1.96 1.79 1.27
Leather and wood
products 0.56 0.43 0.23 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.15 0.15
Textiles and
garments 10.78 8.54 6.25 5.20 4.84 4.68 4.62 3.73
Basic Metals 9.62 14.53 11.43 11.15 10.42 9.18 9.84 11.24
Electrical and
electronic
goods/tools 16.11 11.88 10.47 9.47 8.81 8.18 7.77 7.82
Transport
vehicles 8.39 7.35 8.46 8.79 8.90 7.17 6.97 6.63
Miscellaneous 1.35 1.51 2.51 1.76 1.81 1.88 1.57 1.73
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Central Excise Data51
A striking feature of the excise duty collections is that akin to the
case of the corporation tax, a predominant proportion of collection is paid
by the public sector enterprises.   The contribution of public sector to
total excise collections in 2002-03 was about 42 percent (Table 10).
Another important feature of this component of revenue is the wide
fluctuation from year to year.  It reached the highest share of 53 percent
in 1999-2000, and the share was the lowest in 2001-02 at just about 30
percent.  The fluctuations are due to the fluctuations in administered
prices on items such as steel, coal, minerals and ores, and petroleum
products.  The last one varies with international prices as well.  In other
words, the revenue from excise duties, which constitutes an important
source of revenue for the central government, is vulnerable to pricing
and output decisions of public enterprises and given the significant
dependence on this sector, the ability of the PSUs to forge an
independent pricing policy too could be compromised.







1990-91 9655.69 24514 39.39
1991-92 9815.15 28110 34.92
1992-93 12179.9 30832 39.50
1993-94 12527.11 31697 39.52
1994-95 16414.07 37347 43.95
1995-96 17044.41 40187 42.41
1996-97 22192.87 45008 49.31
1997-98 21719.61 47962 45.29
1998-99 23131.67 53246 43.44
1999-00 32941.53 61902 53.22
2000-01 20824.38 68526 30.39
2001-02 31202.78 72555 43.01
2002-03 34610.32 82310 42.05
Source: Public Enterprises Survey various issues, and Budget of GOI,
various years
Note: Tax provision relates to the provision made for corporate tax52
Customs Duties
 The most important and in many ways far reaching reforms
were in the case of customs tariffs.  Since 1991, imports subject to
quantitative restrictions constituted 90 percent of total imports, and these
restrictions have been virtually done away with.  The import weighted
tariff rates have been reduced from 72 percent in 1990 to 15 percent at
present.  The peak rate of import duty too has been brought down from
over 150 percent in 1991 to less than 20 percent at present (Virmani et.
al, 2004).
A major problem from the viewpoint of efficiency is the
continuation of differentiated tax rates varying with the stages of
production.  The rates on raw materials and intermediate goods continue
to be lower than those on consumer goods and capital goods.   The
import tariff reduction has continued to be guided by this “unprincipled
principle” (Joshi and Little, 1996), and even the Kelkar Task Force on
indirect taxes has suggested that the rate differentiation should be made
on the basis of the stage of production.  This approach retains the focus
on greater protection for “final use industries” as compared to inputs and
intermediate goods, a continued reliance on the self sufficiency model of
development as against a comparative advantage model.
Table 11 presents the commodity group wise collection of
customs from 1990-91 to 2003-04.   Interestingly, despite significant
external liberalisation, almost 60 percent of the duty is collected from just
three commodity groups namely, machinery (26.6%), petroleum products
(21%) and chemicals (11%).  Furthermore, overwhelming proportion
(over 75%) of the duty is collected from either machinery or basic inputs
and intermediate goods.  Thus, contrary to the fear, liberalisation has not
led to massive inflow of consumer goods.  This also implies that further
reduction in the duties and greater uniformity in the structure of duties
would have beneficial effects on the economy.  A detailed econometric
study of Virmani et. al (2004)  shows that uniform reduction in tariffs has
had favourable effects on production, exports, employment and capital
and these gains are different across different sectors.  
The commodity group composition of import duties also shows a
significant increase in the proportion of import duties collected from
machinery from 19.5 percent in 1990-91 to 26.6 percent in 2003-04.
This has happened despite providing exemption to the plant and53
machinery imported for several project imports.  This implies that
external liberalisation is leading to adoption of more modern machinery
and technology in the production process and this would have favourable
effect on the productivity growth.  The other item that has shown
increase in revenue importance is food products.  In contrast, revenue
from iron and steel and other basic metals has shown a substantial
decline over the years and this may be due to the fact that these items
have, over the years have become more competitive and therefore, it is
perhaps more attractive to buy them in the domestic market rather than
importing them. 
6.  Towards Further Reforms in the Tax System
In the last few years, there has been considerable focus on the
reforms in the tax system at the central level with the tax system being
studied by various study groups and task forces.  The Advisory Group on
Tax Policy and Administration for the Tenth Plan (India, 2001) and the
Kelkar Task Force (KTF) reports on direct and indirect taxes (India,
2002) and more recently the KTF on the implementation of the FRBM
Act (India, 2004b) have made a comprehensive examination of the tax
system and made important recommendations to reform.  All these are in
conformity with the direction set by the TRC (India, 1991, 1993) of
broadening the base, reducing the rates, simplification and minimising
rate differentiation in the tax systems.  Like the TRC reports, these
reports emphasise the need to focus on tax administration as well.  While
there are differences relating to some of the specific recommendations of
the KTF, both on direct and indirect taxes and on the FRBM Act, there is
broad agreement on the direction and thrust of reforms and on the
emphasis placed on the reform of tax administration and information
system.
Tax reform is an ongoing process, and in India in particular, with
the fiscal imbalance looming large, reforms to improve the long-run
revenue productivity will have to continue.   The reforms would have to
be within the tax systems, involving tax structure, administration, as well
as institutions.  Besides the general thrust of broadening the tax base,
reducing the rates, make the tax system simple and transparent, it is54
important to evolve a system  which  is  general and   rule  based.    In   a 55
Table 11: Composition of Revenue from Customs Duties
(percent)
1990-91 1995-96 1996-97 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04
Food items 2.49 2.43 2.25 5.42 10.64 8.76 6.36
Tea/coffee 0.12 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.04
Beverages 0.08 0.13 0.07 0.09 0.22 0.16 0.10
Minerals and ores 1.38 0.74 0.52 1.34 1.55 1.80 1.74
Petroleum products 19.39 23.39 28.54 23.16 16.14 19.50 20.93




0.06 0.07 0.05 0.21 0.30 0.44 0.29
Plastics 6.36 4.86 4.71 2.99 3.14 3.07 3.10
Rubber 1.38 1.32 1.48 1.39 1.40 1.30 1.33
Paper 1.04 0.65 0.74 0.70 0.71 0.69 0.89
Textiles 2.16 1.26 0.94 0.97 0.85 0.96 1.40
Cement products etc. 0.20 0.19 0.14 0.19 0.21 0.23 0.26
Ceramics 0.58 0.52 0.45 0.69 0.78 0.75 0.98
Iron and steel 10.24 6.63 5.15 3.81 3.78 3.72 4.64
Other basic metals 4.28 4.95 4.38 2.12 2.30 2.17 2.50
Machinery 19.49 20.84 18.81 23.55 24.80 26.36 26.58
Transport equipment 3.29 4.04 4.69 3.94 3.96 3.37 4.14
Others  15.20 16.16 15.90 19.25 18.06 15.87 13.90
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 10056
democratic polity with so many special interest groups influencing
policies, it is difficult to move away from the culture of selectivity and
discretion, but this has to be achieved over a period of time.   
6.1  Reform of Central Taxes
The reforms with regard to personal income tax will involve
further simplification of the tax system by withdrawing tax exemptions
and concessions on incomes from specified activities.  It is also
necessary to abolish the surcharge and further simplify the tax initially by
reducing the tax brackets to two.  In fact, there is considerable virtue in
having a single tax rate with an exemption limit as many of the
transitional economies have found.  In any case, the ability of the income
tax system in bringing about significant redistribution through tax policy is
limited and if it is taken that equity in fiscal policy should focus on
increasing the incomes of the poor rather than reducing the incomes of
the rich, the objective is better achieved by allocating and targeting
adequate resources to human development rather than creating
disincentives to work, save and invest.  However, moving towards a
single rate of tax may not be politically feasible at this juncture, but it may
be possible to reduce the number of tax rates to two, with a small
reduction in the marginal tax rate (say 25%).
As regards the corporation tax, base broadening involves getting
rid of the tax concessions and preferences.  In particular, the exemption
for profits from exports, free trade zones, technology parks, area-based
exemptions for backward area development, for infrastructure should be
phased out.  Similarly, the depreciation allowance given at present, even
after the proposed reduction in 2005-06 is quite generous and there is a
case for reducing it to more realistic levels and at the same time reducing
the tax rate to align it with the marginal tax rate on personal income tax.
Most importantly, it is important to avoid flip flop in tax policy.  The history
in regard to taxation of dividends, in particular has been full of
contradictory policy stance from one year to another.  It is important to
settle the issue of whether dividends should be taxed in the hands of tax
payers or companies.  The most satisfactory solution is to have partial
integration of the tax with personal income tax.  However, for
administrative reasons, if it is thought that it is better to collect the tax
from the company, then the tax rate applicable on dividends should be
determined on the basis of the difference between the marginal tax rate
of personal income tax and effective rate of corporation tax.
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The other important issue in the context of corporate income tax
is the differential between the rates applicable to domestic and foreign
companies. Part of the rationale for having some differential rests in the
form of the dividend tax, which is payable by domestic companies alone.
The rationalisation of these two aspects therefore needs to go together. 
    With regard to import duties, the reform will have to move in the
direction of further reduction and unification of rates.  As most non-
agricultural tariffs fall between zero and 15 percent, a uniform tariff of 10
percent would considerably simplify and rationalise the systems
(Panagariya, 2005; Acharya, 2005).  Equally important is the need to get
rid of a plethora of exemptions and concessional treatment to various
categories including project imports.  In fact, a minimum tariff of 5
percent on all exempt goods could be introduced as a first step in
rationalising the duty to bring it in line with the above recommendation.
Wide ranging exemption is a problem also with excise duties.
Therefore, one of the most important base-broadening measures should
be to reduce the exemptions.  In particular, the exemptions given to
small scale industry have not only eroded the tax base but have inhibited
the growth of firms into an economic scale. Similarly, various exemptions
given to project imports have significantly eroded the tax base.  This has
also imparted selectivity and discretion to the tax system.  On the
rationalisation of the rate structure, it is important to convert the
remaining items subject to specific duties to ad valorem, and unify the
rates towards a single CenVAT rate.  The next step is to fully integrate
the CenVAT with the taxation of services.  This would require the
extension of the service tax to all services excluding a small list of
exemptions and a small negative list as recommended by the Expert
Group on Service Taxation (India, 2001) M. Govinda Rao.  This would
help in assessing the potential from service taxation.  At the next stage,
the taxes on services could be unified with the CenVAT to evolve a
manufacturing stage value added tax on goods and services. Since the
Acts already provide for credit of the tax paid on both goods and
selective services taxed at present, universal coverage of service tax
with tax credit mechanism and its integration with CenVAT will rationalise
the tax system considerably.  In addition, this tax will have a broader
base and not only increase short term revenues, but also improve
revenue productivity of the tax system. However, it should be pointed out
here, that the restriction of the CenVAT to the manufacturing stage
alone, as at the present juncture, brings in the need to have a number of58
agents in the system, who do not collect and pay taxes to the department
but are entitled to issue VAT invoices. In the Indian context, wholesalers
are authorised to issue multiple VAT invoices on their sales against the
single invoice of their purchases, in order to facilitate the credit
mechanism for small and medium manufacturers, who may not always
buy from other manufacturers. This constitutes a weak link in the chain of
invoices since these agents would be difficult to monitor and administer.
This problem can get further exacerbated with integration of services into
the credit mechanism, since a larger number of agents would seek to
purchase from agents other than manufacturers. This is a problem that
besieges the CenVAT administration today and needs to be addressed.
While the solution discussed by the Tax Reforms Committee (India,
1993) of expanding the coverage of CenVAT to the wholesalers with the
revenue being assigned to the states, is one option, an administrative
alternative could be devised by mandating the filing of informational
documents and periodic auditing of these dealers.
6.2   Evolving Co-ordinated Consumption Tax System
One of the most important reforms needed in indirect tax system
is to evolve a co-ordinated consumption tax system for the country. This
is necessary to ensure fair distribution of the burden of taxation between
different sectors and between goods and services, improve the revenue
productivity, minimise relative price distortions and above all, ensure a
common market in the country without placing any impediments on the
movement of factors and products.  
The above involves co-ordinated reforms at central, state, and
local levels.  At the centre, as mentioned above, the first step is to evolve
a manufacturing stage VAT on goods and services.  At the state level,
the reform initiated in April, 2005, of introducing the VAT has to be
completed.  The most important step involved in this is the extension of
input tax credit mechanism not only to intra-state trade but also inter-
state trade by introducing appropriate zero-rating mechanism.  This
would require building up a proper information system on inter-state
transactions, which has been initiated.  This will have to be adopted by
all the states and union territories.  Also, appropriate mechanisms will
have to be found for enabling the states to levy the tax on services and
integrating it with the VAT on goods, so as to arrive at a comprehensive
VAT. An important problem in this regard is devising a system for59
taxation of services with an inter-state coverage, which would depend
closely on the mechanism chosen for zero-rating inter-state trade.   
An important aspect from the viewpoint of efficiency in resource
allocation is the continued cascading of the tax on petroleum products.
These are kept outside the CenVAT system.  They are also not a part of
the VAT system in states.  These contribute to over 40 percent of the
revenues of both the taxes.  Considering the use of these items for
intermediate consumption, the extent of cascading and relative price
distortion will continue to be high.
  
In terms of the burden distribution, extending the scope of
service tax to all services and then unifying it with CenVAT in a revenue
neutral manner would help bring down the CenVAT rate approximately
by about three percentage points.  This would enable the centre to
reduce the VAT rate to about 12 percent and for reasons of equity and
revenue, a special excise of an additional 6 percent could be levied on
items of luxury consumption (Acharya, 2005).   The tax rate of 12 percent
at manufacturing stage would be equivalent to 8 percent at retail stage
assuming that value added beyond the stage of manufacturing amounts
to a third of the retail value of the commodity.  KTF on indirect taxes
assumed that the overall consumption tax burden should not exceed 20
percent, and in such a case, a 12 percent manufacturing stage VAT
would leave a tax room of about 12 percent to the states for the levy of
VAT at the retail stage.   Along with the levy of VAT at the state level, it is
important to integrate many of the existing taxes, such as entertainment
tax, electricity duty, passengers and goods tax and luxury tax on hotels.
Also there is no case for turnover taxes, surcharges, and additional
taxes.
The local level indirect tax reform relates to the abolition of
octroi.  There is no place for octroi in any modern tax system. The
problem, however, is of finding an alternative source of revenue. In every
country, property tax is a mainstay of local body finances and reform in
this area should help in raising revenue productivity.  Yet, this may not
suffice.  In this situation, a better option is to allow the local bodies to
piggyback on the VAT collections in urban local body jurisdictions.  This
will avoid cascading of the tax and minimise tax spillovers by the urban
local bodies to non-residents.60
6.3   Reform in Tax Administration
In India, until recently the focus of tax reform attempts was on
“what to do” and much less on “how to do”. The administrative dimension
has been in the periphery rather than the centre of tax reform (Bird,
1989).  The TRC did emphasise the need to reform tax administration to
some extent but it is the KTF on Direct and Indirect taxes that has
brought the administrative dimension to the centre of reform process.
Not surprisingly, the poor state of tax administration has been a
major reason for low levels of compliance and high compliance cost.  A
major aspect of poor tax administration is the virtual absence of data on
both direct and indirect taxes even at the central level.  Not only that this
rendered proper analysis of taxes to provide adequate analytical
background to calibrate changes in tax structure, but also it made proper
enforcement of the tax difficult.  Thus the changes in the tax structure
had to be made in an ad hoc manner.  Given the complexity in the tax
structure and poor information system, the tax system often, acquired the
character of negotiated payments (India, 1993, 2002a, 2002b).  The
consequence of this has been a high compliance cost.  The only
estimate of compliance cost by Das-Gupta (2004a, 2004b) of both
personal income and corporation tax shows that in the case of personal
income tax it is as high as 49 percent of personal income tax collections
and in the case of corporate tax, between 6 and 15 percent of the tax
paid, with the bulk being legal costs of compliance.  While these
estimates should be taken with a note of caution as the author himself
has reservations on the adequacy and quality of the sample analysed,
the important point to note is that the compliance cost in Indian income
taxes is extremely high.   
High compliance cost combined with poor state of
computerisation and information system has led to continued interface of
taxpayers and tax officials, negotiated payment of taxes, corruption and
rent seeking and low levels of tax compliance.  An important indication of
the poor state of information system is seen by the fact that even as the
coverage of TDS was extended over the years, there was virtually no
information system to check whether those deducting the tax at source
file the returns and pay the tax.  As the CAG report for 2003-04 states, of
the 626 thousand returns to be filed by TDS assesses, only 499
thousand returns were filed.  In other words, more than 20 percent of the
TDS assesses did not file the returns.  Even this is a vast improvement61
from the previous year when almost 80 percent of the TDS assesses did
not file the returns.  
The fact that tax administration was the soft underbelly of the tax
system and is a critical element in improving tax policy and revenue
productivity has been underlined for long (Das-Gupta and Mookherjee,
1998).  The Chelliah Committee (India, 1993) devoted considerable
attention to this issue and the ideas of building a tax information network
go back to the recommendation of this committee.   The Kelkar Task
Force on Direct and Indirect Taxes rightly brought these issues to the
fore with greater emphasis once again. 
Recent initiatives on building the computerised information
system in direct taxes follow from the recommendations of the KTF.  The
Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) outsourced the function of issuing
PAN which in turn has facilitated the compiling of information on all
taxpayers.  Furthermore, the Tax Information Network has been
established by the National Securities Depository Limited (NSDL).  The
initial phase was focused on ensuring that TDS assesses do in fact file
the returns, besides matching and cross-checking the information from
banks and financial institutions to ensure that the taxes paid according to
the returns are actually credited into government accounts.  The Online
Tax Accounting System (OLTAS) was operationalised in July, 2004.
This has helped to expedite the number of refunds from 2.6 million in
2002-03 to 5.6 million in 2003-04.  The PANs issued increased to 36
million by late 2004.  Large companies such as Infosys Ltd could now
upload one diskette for filing the TDS of their employees instead of filing
separate TDS returns for each employee.  In short, in the last four years,
the direct taxes have shown annual growth rate of over 20 percent per
year and the contribution of improved information system in this has not
been insignificant.
Similar initiatives have been taken in regard to indirect taxes as
well.  The customs e-commerce gateway (ICEGATE), Customs
Electronic Data Interchange System ICES) have helped to improve the
information system and speed up the clearance processes.  In 2003-04,
ICES handled about 4 million declarations in automated customs
locations which constituted about 75 percent of India’s international
trade. The technical assistance from Canadian International
Development Agency (CIDA) has helped the excise department to
establish and build capacity in modern audit systems and computerise62
risk assessment for detailed audit.  This is a step-up in building up
expertise in areas requiring significant technical of expertise. Both the
direct and indirect tax departments could gain from building up expertise
through functional specialisation in such identified areas which require
technical and focused expertise. 
These initial steps in building computerised information system
are the basic requirement for tax administration.  The second phase of
the TIN has been initiated and when completed, this should help not only
in better administration and enforcement of the tax but also in planning
the policy changes in regard to the tax system.   Computerised
information system will help to put together data from a variety of
relevant sources, ensure better administration and enforcement of the
tax, and thus improve tax compliance.  It will also help in significantly
reducing the compliance cost as it will avoid the need to interact with tax
officials.  An important constraint for this is the fact that many of the
senior officers are not initiated to computers and there is natural
hesitancy and often unwillingness on their part to adapt to new
technology.  Orientation workshops can go a long way in managing this
change well.   
Another critical element in tax administration is the networking of
the information from various sources.  As mentioned earlier, systems
have to be evolved to put together information received from various
sources to quantify the possible tax implications from them in a legally
acceptable manner to improve tax enforcement.  In the first instance, the
information networking should get the data from various sources such as
banks and financial institutions for various assesses.  In the second,
CBDT and CBEC should exchange information to ensure a measure of
consistency between the returns filed by the two departments.  In the
third, it is necessary to exchange information between central and state
taxes.  It is only through a well organised and computerised information
system of returns, will it be possible to enforce the tax and improve tax
compliance.  63
7.  Concluding Remarks
The foregoing analysis shows that there has been significant
progress in tax reforms particularly in tax administration in recent years
that has helped in the recovery of tax-GDP ratio close to the levels that
prevailed prior to significant reduction in customs.  This, however, is only
the beginning, and considerable distance in reforming the tax system is
yet to be covered.  In other words, the tax system reform including
reform in administration is a continuous exercise for improving the
revenue productivity, minimise distortions and improve equity.  
It is important to note that the reforms should be undertaken at
central, state as well as local levels.  A major objective should be to
minimise distortions and compliance cost.  In fact, the sub-national tax
system should be evolved such that the principles of common market are
not violated.   It is also necessary that domestic trade taxes on goods
and services should be calibrated in a coordinated manner in the spirit of
cooperative federalism. Coordinated calibration of domestic and external
trade taxes to ensure the desired degree of protection to domestic
industry and the desired burden of consumption taxes to the community
is also necessary. 
 
Broadening the base of both central and state taxes and keeping
the tax structures simple  within the administrative capacity of the
governments is an important international lesson that has to be taken
note of in calibrating further reforms.   Phasing out small scale industry
exemptions, minimising exemptions and concession to industries in the
services sector, minimising discretion and selectivity in tax policy and
administration are all important not only for the soundness of the tax
system but to enhance its acceptability and credibility.  
Although the customs duties have been significantly reduced,
India is still one of the highly protected economies.  Further reduction in
tariffs as also further unification and rationalisation is necessary.  This
would certainly entail loss of revenue and there has to be corresponding
improvement in the revenue productivity in all the taxes. The reforms in
converting the prevailing sales taxes into a destination based
consumption type VAT by the states initiated in April, 2005, will have to
be carried out with vigour and completed within the next few years.  This64
would require complete phasing out of the central sales tax.  Finalising
the mechanism to relieve taxes on inter-state transactions and building a
proper information system for the purpose, is therefore, extremely
important, both to improve the revenue productivity and to improve the
efficiency of the tax system.  
The most important reform is in tax administration.  It is important
to reiterate that “Tax administration is tax policy” (Cassenegra, 1990).
Making a transition to information based tax administration, online filing
of tax returns, and compiling and matching information is most desirable.
It is also important to note that there must be a large taxpayer unit which
not only compiles information, its collation and matching, but should also
assist taxpayers without delay, and thus help them to reduce their
compliance costs.   66
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Endnotes
1  The important exception to this is the introduction of expenditure tax
on Kaldor’s advise in the mid 1950s.  See, India (1956).
2  Richard Bird (1993, p.2721) reviewing the three volume Report of the
Tax Reform Committee states, “ The three reports on tax reform in India
…generally offer clear and sound guidance as to what can and should
be done…”.
3 The Report of the Task Force on the Implementation of Fiscal
Responsibility and Budget Management Act, 2003 (India, 2004) for
example, states, “Indirect tax policy in India tends to be constantly
battered by special interest groups that find it to their interest to have
the structure cater to their particular benefit.”
4  In U.S for example, there have been several studies analyzing the
impact of Tax Reform Act, 1986.  For detailed review of these studies,
see Auerback and Slemrod (1997).
5  Rajaraman (2004) cites the estimates of the IMF study (Ebrill et.al.,
2001) to show that countries with higher per capita GDP tended to gain,
but the poorer countries tended to lose by introducing the VAT.  Besides
the usual problems with cross-country regression estimates which both
the papers point out, it must be noted that a properly calibrated VAT
with its information on turnovers can improve income tax.  In Thailand
for example, the introduction of VAT replacing the manufacturers’ sales
tax in 1991 at a uniform rate of 7% which was actually less than the
revenue neutral rate (10%), led to full revenue recovery.  What was
surprising was that it also increased the income tax by 25 percent.
(India, 1995).
6  According to a report in the Financial Times of  April 6, 2005, last year in
India, the use of credit card by foreigners increased by 42 percent to
USD. 75 million
7  See. Harberger (2003) and Bird and Zolt (2005).
8 The  88
th Amendment to the Constitution of India assigns the power to
levy service tax to the central government, with the proceeds being
collected and appropriated by the central and state governments, in
accordance with the principles formulated by the Parliament.
9  For incomes from capital alone, with a wealth tax of 5 percent, the
above tax structure meant that there was a ceiling on income at Rs.
250 thousand – this was the desired goal as explicitly recorded in the
budget speech of 1971-72.
10  Indira Gandhi, presenting the 1970-71 budget stated, “Taxation is also
a major instrument in all modern societies to achieve greater equality of
incomes and wealth.   It is, therefore, proposed to make our direct tax65
                                                                                                                                 
system serve this purpose by increasing income taxation at higher
levels as well as by substantially enhancing the present rates of taxation
on wealth and gifts.”
11  Arbalaez (2002) for discussion of effects of such a tax in Columbia.
12  Thereafter only a few commodities remained on specific duties – tea,
cement, and cigarettes are notable among these.
13  The NIPFP had undertaken several studies on the tax systems in
various states since 1980 and this included Assam, Bihar, Kerala,
Madhya Pradesh, Punjab and Tamil Nadu,  Uttar Pradesh has a
tradition of appointing a tax reform committee every five years.
Sometimes, the studies were repeated after some years.  These
recommendations continue to be pertinent suggesting that very few
have been translated into policy.
14  There is also a commodity tax at the local level called “octroi”.  This is a
tax on the entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use, or sale.
This tax levied by urban local bodies and in application in many states.
15  The tax ratios however do vary significantly across states, with the
southern states of Kerala, Karnataka, and Tamil Nadu on average,
recording higher levels than the other states.
16  Effective tax rates are derived by applying the tax structure to reference
income levels. Given the limited sample size, such an exercise would
not be empirically sound and hence is not reported.
17 The  Income Tax Act provides for   some  deductions  in  the  case  of
business and traders. The deductions include expenditure on travel and
entertainment. Further, expenses on telecommunications too are a case
in point. While any income tax return would show some or all of these
expenses as business expenses, in most other consumer surveys,
these would figure as personal expenses. Given that the proportion of
these expenses in total income is likely to be higher in the “middle”, and
given the higher possibility of this group of agents being in the “middle”,
it appears that this definitional issue itself could induce the pattern
observed in the paper.
18  The rationale for a  separate  taxation  of    dividends is that the effective
rate of corporation tax is lower due to tax preferences and therefore, the
difference should be taxed to treat corporations on the same footing as
unincorporated businesses which pay the tax at personal income tax
rates.